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INTRODUCTI ON 
11 To put it simply , 11 'll ri t ea Howard K. Smith, 11 t here are far too many 
Italians living on t oo li t tle in Italy. nl This, simply enough indeed, is 
the e pitome of all the social pr oblems of Ital y . The simple fact invi tes 
an equally simple answer, namely , stabil ize the populat ion in Italy and in-
crease the production of goods. 
Bu t simple facts and simple ans'f/ers obvious ly give no clues as to hO'fl 
one is t o proceed in fo rmul ating and carrying out a policy that will ach ieve 
a desirable solution. The social problems of I taly, in t heir agricultural , 
indus t rial and psychological aspects must be stat ed in such a way that they 
\'Till yie l d up s pecif ic clues to their poss ible solutions. Stated in such 
a manner simple pr oblems become complex patterns of comp onent problems, 
ivh ich themselves may be similarly sub-divided t o yield u p s ti ll more cl ues. 
But an excessive atomizat i on of human probl ems is to be avoided because it 
will only lead to a jumble of facts 'flhich, being t oo much isolated from 
each other , lose the ir meaningfulnes s and their relevance to reality . 
The s pecialist , of course, can expertly choose from a confuse d abundance 
of detai ls jus t those relevant to h is narrow task and link them into con-
struc tive arrays. T'nis i s i mportant work forever in progr ess . Bu t our 
analysis he re will be on a much more general level \'/here 'ire shall deal with 
gene ral problems and ove rall polieies. This kind of analysi s is i mportant, 
t oo. It is, i n fact , comp lementary to the specialist 1s analysis for i ts 
purpose is t o relate the f indings of various specialis t s t o each other in 
l. Howard K. Smith, The Sta t e of Europe, N. Y., Kno pf , 1949 , P• 208 . 
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such a way that a p icture corres ponding to r eality v<ill emerge . At the 
same t ime t h e de tails contri buted by e a ch s pecialist vdll be presenred in-
tact. In thi s v1ay we may escape the myo pic viewpoint (and judgment) of 
many a s peci a li s t a nd t he beclouded viet•rpoint (and j u dgment ) of many a 
generalis t . To insure, mor e over , that t h e detai ls in the pictur e d o n o t 
become confusingly minute, we vri ll use f or the purpose of t his paper not 
the s pecialist' s scratch sheet but his final copy . 
Ou r c oncern wi th Ital ian social problems 1:! i ll be f rom t h e poin t of view 
of American economic forei gn po licy toward t hat country. The United 
States has l a tely t a ken an int ense interest in Ita lian domes ti c problems . 
I t is a f air ques t ion to ask why is the private life of Italy , s o to 
speak, of so much coneern to the United States ? The answer i s that since 
t h e end of 1,vorld \var I I all the prob lems of Hestern civilization seem to 
hav e be come Ameri can pr oblems; all i t s ills, American concerns ; all threats 
to its i deals, t h reats to Ame r ican ideals. ~·fhy it i s that the Ame r ican 
people f eel t hus t hreatened is not a subjec t for an alysis h e r e. No one, 
indeed , can be a bsolutely certain whethe r the American way of life is be-
i ng threatened ( and in I tal y , of all p laces) and , if so, by ivhat, exactly, 
and in '>/ha t way; or -vrhether it >vill ch ange for bet ter or for uors e (leav-
ing a s i de the ques t ion of what is better and what is worse). But America ns 
are not af raid of change but only wish t o insure that that change \>.fill be 
for the good of both the United States and t he re s t of the v10rld . The 
greatest calumny ever d irected a~ainst the Ameri can pe o ple is the char ge 
t hat t hey are f i :>;hting a gainst change, that they are a sterile f orce in the 
world t rying to protec t t he stat us quo. T}Jis , it is suggested , h as not 
genera lly been true in the past. It is untrue today. 
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1'he fact remains ths.t the American pe op l e feel tl1r e a tened by certa in 
for ce s in the world . The "-meri can Government is a cting upon t hat as-
sumption . In so do i ng the United State s h as taken an int ense interest in 
the internal conditions of' other count ries . Thi s i nterest has resul t e d in 
a fore i gn policy that is unique in the h istory o f n ations , Th e United 
States has unde r taken to expend gre a t quanti ties of i t s human energy and 
material r esources i n a n a ttempt to spee d and i nsure the moral and ma t erial 
rehabilitation of a grea t numbe r of i t s a l lies and former enemies a f ter 
t h e rJ.ost des t ruc t i ve v1ar in mode r n hi story . Such a poli cy raises s e rious 
ques t ions. Vlhat , exac t ly, are 1t1e t r y i ng to do in these countrie s ? What 
are aur aims a nd what are we doing to achieve them? 
One v1ay to arrive a t an answer to these ques t ions is to examine Ameri can 
f oreig n poli cy a t work i n a par t icular instance, Italy seems to be a n 
es pecis.lly appropriate e xample to choo se in this connection. First, it is 
a country that represents an especially stron g chs.llenge t o Amer i can 
rehabili t a t ion policy. "econd, America n f oreign pol icy in I ta. l y t y pi fi e s 
a s we ll as, perha p s better than, American f oreign policy i n any other 
ii:uropean c ountry t he es sential s piri t in vvhi ch the Uni t e d States has em-
barked on its pre sent mi s sion, a s pirit in wh ich selfish a nd a l t r uis t i c 
motivati on , c oopera t ion and coe r cion , revo l u t ionary and counter-rev olu t ion-
ary activi t y ach ieve a delicate bal ance . 
I n th is pa pe r i·Te shall examine t o pi cally t he main prob l ems v1h ich must be 
dealt v1i t h to ach i e v e the economic and social rehabilitation of Italy in 
the a g rarian , industrial ae1d political field s. These problems have l ong 
h istories, ~'hey are n ot postwar probl ems bu t trad i tional pr oblems t hat 
have been aggravat ed by the l ate \'far. It is, inde e d , the fact that they 
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are tradi t ional that makes them so hard to confront, let alone solve. 
1bey seem t o have acquired a sort of prescriptive res pectability.l rhey 
have become a part o? t:!'le I tal ian way of life, so interwoven into th e social 
f abric of Ita ly that to alter the present unbeautif ul patt ern it is 
nece s sary t o unrave l t he fabr i c almos t t o the point of disintegration . But 
make no mistake. The Italian social fab ric is no weake r for all i t s alleged 
ugliness. ':!:'he delicate quest i on, theref ore, is how ene~getically can ~,re 
act so that stubb orn fibers can be roo ted out >vi thout s o much tension 
being created t hat s uddenly the whole fabric f lies apart. 
The agrarian, industrial and psychological as pe cts of Italy's social 
problem vfill be treated analytically rather than historically. 1'he vie>v 
here is that from the standpoint of current policy requirements few guides 
to ac ti on v<ill be suggested by an historical study of Italy 1s problems that 
cannot be more readily and easily elici t ed by a static, analytical 
study . But this is not to i mply that Ita lian history will be i gno r e d as 
irrelevant. An analy t ica l approach will, however , f ocus atten t ion on the 
i mne diacy and urgency of Italian social problems in the present day. It 
'trill a lso simplify the t ask of catalog;uing the e ssent ial facts of each 
situat ion and of point ing out the present rel a tionships a:r. ong them . 
In trea ting t he agrarian problem we shall examine the fa ct ors of fer-
tility , land tenure, populati on and the state of agricul t ural technology, 
the r elationships among the se and the resul tants of these rela·tionships. 
In the indus t rial sector our a t tent ion will be occupied with the stat e of 
Italian natural resources, of employment, of the organization of indus t ry 
------- -- ·--··--- ---
l. Cf. Carlo Levi, 11 Ita ly Fights the Battle of Illiteracy," Ne\v York Times 
Ma~azine, Nov. 6, 1949, pp . 14-15. 
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and its ma.r ket and , again, "1-Ti th the re la t ionships among these facts. Our 
examination of Italy's sociological pr oblem will include an examination 
of Italisn political par t ies and t he rela t ionships of t hese to lt~ly 1 s 
social problems . 
In Part II \ve sball examine the develo pment of postwar American economic 
forei gn pol icies toHard I taly , the ir aims, their modus operandi, their 
subs t s.ntive pro :; r~m s and their results, both absolute and in rela t ion to 
American aims. From this and all tbe for egoing analysis we may t hen be 
able to state a valid answer to t he paramount ques t ion of thi s paper , 
namely , to what extent is Amer ican foreign economic poli cy in Italy ef f ect-
ively promoting its own ends? 
PART I 
ITALIAN SOCIAL PROBLID4S 
OHAPTER I 
THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM 
'!he North-South Pattern 
To an even greater degree than .in the United · States the phenomenon of 
the contrast and the conflict between the northern and the s.outhern sections 
of the . country pervades almost every phase of the · discus.si.on of Italian 
social problems • The difference is based on differ ences in ne:tural r-e-
gional wealth. If' the difference were- within .the. bounds. of moder.acy, 1 ts 
further ramifications would be few and . perhaps of small consequence. Un-
fortunately t his is not the case. There is a vast diff erence · in economic 
wealth between the Italian North and th.e.- Italian .South. And since· the-
North is by no meana economically rich by the standards of weatern civiliz-
ation it ia easy to see how abjeetly poor the South is. The economic 
difference between the North and the. South and the .. economic relationship 
between these two sections may be partially indi.cated by a comp.arison of' 
their respective posi tiona in the Italian budgetary operations for the 
fiscal year 1948-1949 (the Italian fiscal year covers f rom July 1 of a 
given year to June 30 of the following year). In fiscal 1948 governmental 
opera tiona in the North resulted in an ex.cess of revenue over outlay, i.e., 
a ,net income of' 245.8 billion lire while in the South the Government sus-
tained a deficit of 117.5 billion lire. Only four of the smaller regions 
in the North failed to cover the Government's outlay in their areas (the -
four combined accounted for 12.2 billion lire of the def icit in the nation-
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al budget). None of the southern regions vas self-supporting. These 
figures do not include a 243 billi.on lire deficit for the region of Lazio 
(a par.t of the South) since this sum. reflects the cost of running the 
national Government at Rome.l 
These facts . show that the South. is supported economically by the North. 
This has - always been true. It is the South's poverty in physical re ... 
sources that makes it economically p9or and. therefore inferior to the 
North in respect both to industry and agriculture. But the South's physi-
cal inferiority has also resulted in . social . inf'eriori,:ty·.; '!bus. •the .Itali-an 
of' the South is to the Italian of the rest of' Italy as the latter is to 
the European of' the North •••• n2 No one knows this bett.er than. the.· Italian 
himself'. '!he Italian, in fact, t-ends to. look with .. conde•cene.ion. o.n hi.s 
fellow Italian in direct proportion to the distance of the latter 1s home 
town> (paeee) from the southern extremi:.ty of the. Italian penins,ula. 
The North-South theme .initaly 1s life, then; has economic, and social 
implica.tions. '!he theme will be further developed; along with its con-
notations, in the course · of thi.s paper. 
The geographical division be.tween the Italian North and South . occurs 
roughly at about the location of Rome. Most maps . wil..l probably indicate 
the northern geographical boundary of the- South aa- the line, ·formed by the 
northern extremities of the regions of' Campania and Abruz.zi, which lie 
south of Rome. The Italian South pro.per, in short, is that area- that was 
once known as the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. The, North proper will 
1. La Produzione in Italia, (Milan), Aug., 1950, (unpagina,ted). 
2. Carlo Sforza, Italy and the Italians, Edward Hutton, tr., N.Y., 
Dutton & Compan,y, 1949, P• 915· 
probably be shown to reach as f'ar south as . the. northern boundar.i.ee of' 
Tuscany and the Marches,. thus leaving. an area in the middl.e of the Italian 
penineula .known .as- Central. Italy. 
Here we will usually speak only of' the . Nor..th and the South~ including 
Central .Italy, as . many wri.ters· do, with the·· North. The is~ande . of' Sicily 
and Sardinia, of course., are in all respects· parts of the. Sou.th. And it 
goes almost without eey-ing that there· is no .ab.r:upt . change, at the northern 
boundary of' Campania, from southern problems and characte.riatics to 
northern. 
ltaly·-'s Agrarian Econoicy" 
One. f'act mus.t be made . clear at the outset,. namely, that Italy 'a economy 
is preponderantly agrarian. Around 48 per. cent of' the Italian .. labor for.ce 
in 19~6 was employed in agr.i.cultl!lre. Sinoe . then .the · population of Italy 
has increased from around 4~ million to about 46 million people and it 
seems reasonable .in view of this, and .in view of the much greater indus-
trial unemployment today to assume that the labor force - in agriculture has 
increased absolutely and also .in relation to the total labor force. 
As the table on the following page shows (Table l) appr.oximat.ely 50 per 
cent of the male labor force in 19~6 was engaged in agriculture! while in 
19~0 this percentage had been sixty-one.2 Today, the. percentage is prob-
ably closer to the latter figure. The enormous importance of agriculture 
in the Italian economy eme.rgee even more forcefully when w.e consider that 
one-half of the Italian people live on the land.~ In the United States 
1. London, Oxford University Press, 1947, 
2. 
;. 
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only about one-fifth of the po.pulaticm is rural. 
It is hardly. necessary, in\~view :)Bf these .statistics; to dwell further on 
the fact that the Italian .economy is. .an agrari.an economy. and that therefore 
the. agrarian problem is of prime importance among. the social proble~s of 
Italy. 
I 
TABLE 1 
OCCUPATIONS OF ITALIANS OVER 10 YEARS OF AGE IN 19~* 
Agriculture . • • • • 
Forestry,fishing & ~ting • 
All others . • • • • 
Industry • • • • • • 
Manufacturing • • • 
Construction • • • • 
Mining &. quarrying • 
• 
All others • • • • 
Commerce, banking & insurance • 
Administration • • • 
Public • • • • 
Private 
• • 
Transportation & communications • 
Liberal. arts, profesaions & 
• • 8,842,785 
86,721 
8,756,064 
• • • • 5.~75,152 ~.980,046 
979,10~ 
128,446 
287,557 
• • 1,605,~6~ 
• • • 889,925 808,866 
81,059 
• • •·· • 702,201 
religious cults • • • • 269,281 
Domestic economy • • • • • • 660,725 
* Sources: Summarized· from U.N. Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1948, N.Y., 1949, p. 72, and Muriel Grindrod, 
'Ihe New Italy, London, Oxford University Press, 1947, 
p. 58. 
Land Fertility 
The agrarian problem of Italy is dominated by ·several factors, all of 
them intimately interrel.ated . and reacting upon each other. to form a. pattern 
which has long promoted poverty and all its pernicious. consequences. lv1ore-
over, more than in the industriaLsector, the No.rth-South .dichotozey" stands 
out in Italian agriculture, both in a technical and ... social sense. 
Some of the physical facts of Italian agriculture may be summarized 
briefly: 
Italy's area is 116,500 square miles (almost 72 million acres). 
5 
All but ~0,000 square. miles of Italy 1e area .is mountainous.l 
About one-half' of Italy may be classified as. mountainous and sub-arid.2 
Italy •a farmland amou:ats.- to jus~ under 54 million acres.~ 
About one-tenth of Italy 1s land surface is . unproduoti.ve, one-fifteenth 
(or almost five million acres) is .productive. but uncultivated.4 
Moat of Italy's land is in poor condition. However, the problem of' 
land fertility, or rather, the lack of fertility, is primarily a southern 
problem. Carlo Sforza maintains, "The only real diff'erence · between· North 
and South in Italy is of the economic order: the land south of Rome cannot 
be compared for richness to that to the. north.n5 
The land's infertility is due to both · man .and nature. '!he se>uthern soil 
is naturally poor. During the, war, however, the soil over the whole of 
Italy was further impov,e-riehed because of excess.ive· exploitation coupled 
with a lack of fertilizer (for Italy produces no. phospha tea). 6 The lack 
. of' fertilizer is still a serious problem for italy. 
'!'he natural poverty of' the s.oil in the South is complemented, from the 
standpoint of' the effects of infertility, by a malicious climate. "When 
one speaks of our South," writes Sforza, . "one must never f.orge.t that the . 
drought destroys · three crops out of' ten, with astronomical precision. n7 
Unlike the rest of' Italy it rains here only in the winter · and there. are no 
rivers such as the Po or the much les.ser Arno. to water the land in the 
summer. 
1. Giuseppe Saragat, "Italian Democracy in Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 
JJ(VIII, July, 1950, p. 616. 
2. UNRRA, Sur.vey of' Italy 1s. Economy, Rome, 1947, p. 25. 
~- Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, p. 14. 
4. UNR.ttA, Survey, p. 25. 5· Sforza, Italy & Italians, pp.96-97 
6. Grindrod, The New Italy, p. 64. 
7• Sforza, Italy and the Italians, p. 97· 
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The evils of" the southern clime. te are c.ompounded by the aoti vi ty of" man. 
There is widespread de.forestation throughout the South, the result of" in-
discriminate logging which has been going on since Roman times and was 
speeded up about the time of the country 1 s unification when extens.ive rail-
road const ruction became .. possible and ne.ces,sary.l The significance· of" de-
forestation for soil fertility becomes .: apparen.t when. w.e consider that south-
ern Italy is largely mount ainous and fore.ate are especially essential to 
prevent large scale e·rosion by he.avy winter rains., and to. help .reta:in .some 
of the rainfall over a period of time to water the land as it be~omes 
thirsty. 
There is, however, a margin of rich coastal soil in the South amounting 
to around one-tenth of' the total southern acreage. This coastal area is 
supporting one-half' of the southern. peasant p.opulation. 2 
Land Tenure 
OUr concern with infertility, of' course,. is related implicitly to the 
all-important question of productivity. Infertility i.e. not the only factor 
in the South that reduces productivity and keeps. that region in a constant 
state of poverty. The produc.tivi ty of' the land is also closely related to 
the economic and technological organizat ion of' the · agricultural system.~ 
Here we examine the. effects of' the economic organization of Italia....Tl 
agriculture upon productivity, a factor as i mportant as 9.1W other we may 
consider. The larger are the areas cultivated. as a unit the more. it is 
possible to make improvements such as building storage sheds, ~ing tractor , 
1. Of'. Elizabeth_ Wiekemann, "Poverty and Population in the South," Foreign 
Af'f.airs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, P• 85. 
2. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, P• 18. 
~. Of'. Moore, Economic Demography, p. 44. 
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irrigating, etc. All of these projects can be more fully utilized (and 
therefore become more profitable) on a larger than, on a smaller holding 
and, indeed, cannot be paid .for in . the f'irst place unle.ss the landholder 
has a considerable income· from his land.l Furthermore, if an indi.vidual 
cultivates a large area .in the aggregate · but divided up as small plots 
scattered over the countryside he wastee ·time going from one plot to the 
other and, more important, cannot afford to improve any one plot ade-
quately.. It may be no.ted here that the owner of. a large. estate may prefer 
to let parts of his holdings . in- such a . way · as to . accomplish .either of' the 
two oondi tiona above, i.e;., to create large· farms., which . respond to im-
provements or to create small .. sc.attered plots which discourage im.pro..vements. 
All these considerations have a bearing on the land 1 s pro.ductivity. At the 
same time. the organization of the · .sys.tem of tenur.e will .dete r.mine; to some 
extent the organization of the classes of rural; population. Thus . the 
agrarian sector of the economy ramifi.es - into the nation 1s . social structure. 
How is Italian agriculture organized in terms of people and land'? The 
available data. are based on the ceneue of 1936, so it isprobably wise to 
use only round . numb.era · in order that the fundamental . proportions will not 
be obscured by details · whi.ch:: are.- bound: to be -inaccurate in .any case. The 
main classes of persons. engaged in agric.ul ture in Italy are. shown in Table 
2 on the following · page. 
The -owner classinc1ude.s .owners of both largelanded estates called 
latif ondi or latif'undia and. owner.s ·of smaller: holdings. Altogether t)'lese 
holdings include about 77·5 per cent: of the .tote.l .acreage of' Italy (the 
rest being owned by the local and central governments and by corporate 
1. Cf. Moore, Economic Demography, PP• 102-10;. 
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bodies such as the Church). These private holding.s number about 9.5 
m11Uon. 1 
The startling fact about these hol dings. is the. range of their sizes and 
the distribution. within that. range. 83.3 per cent o£ all holdings are . o£ 
five acres or l ess but account for only 21.5 per cent of the totaL acre.age. 
The latifondi comprise-only:. one-tenth. of one percent of all the. uni.:ta .but 
hold 26 per cent of the total acreage. Most of the · acreage 1.a held in. 
holdings of 125 acres or less ·. '!here are f i ve million holdings which are 
of one. and. one-quarter acres or less. (The total number o£ units is 
2 9,512,000.) 
.TABLE 2 
CLASSES OF PEOPLE OVER 10 YEARS. OF AGE 
ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE I N 1936 * 
Classes Number 
(millions) 
Owners • • • . • • • 2.8 • • 
Crop sharers (mezzadri) • • l. 7 • • 
Tenants & eombina.tion owner-
crop sharer-tenants . • • 1.7 • • 
Laborers (braccianti) • • • 2.3 • • 
Per Cent 
33 
• 20 
• 20 
27 
*Source.: Summarized from Einaudi, Social Research; XVII, 
March, 1950, p. 11. These figures · are · ad·justed to the 
present boundaries. Figure.s not. so adjusted may be found 
in Moore, Economic Demo.graphy,p p. 261. The · ac:tual total 
of persons.· in agriculture given· by Einaudi ie 8 ,609,000 
which includes 41,000 technicians and. others. 
It is easy to see that. in Italy there · are- land owners and land owners. 
The individual owners who work their own fragmentary holdings· are· & m,ixed 
lot, according to Einaudi, from . . the viewpoint of economic. well-being. M~ 
of them live in misery, but most of them live in comparative well-bei ng and 
secur.i ty .3 ·They may hold their land in the form of one farm or they may 
1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, PP• 14, 17. 
2. Ibid., P• 14. 3• Ibid., P• 15. 
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hold several plots .. of' land, po.asibly" each. one less than· an: acre .and . all of' 
them scattered about the.; oountrysi..de.. In· .the, la.t.ter· cas.e . the· peasant~. who 
us.ually 1 i vee in smalL l:llral . muni:ci..pall;t.ies., may.. work one- plot one , day :and 
another on the .. next day, or ·he may. have;· sons. to work: hi~: Tarious: plots. If' 
th.e peasant doea -have' several. e0na. and .. they d.o not. migrate . to· the city or 
go to sea, his plots aredivi.ded .up among them .upon. his death •. At .thia 
time if' there are no.t .enough .. plo.te to go around the ·· larger plots may be 
divided up into smaller ones. It is in ... this" way that.·  the: f'ragmenta.tio.n of' 
land. holdings has. gona .on in Italy. The Government, as we shall. ·see, has 
taken steps to curb this practioe .. 
. The point to be made relative· .to th.e small .. landowner,. however, is that 
the . mere f'a.ct of ownership does much to. mitigate. his discontent. 
The category of'. land .holding.s : of' between 125 .and .. 250 .acres (ac:eounti~g 
for about nine. per cent of Italy 's · agric.ul tura.l acreage.) is .. a border one 
between . the individually. owned . farm .whi.ch i .s w.orked by th.e- owne.r. as· a . unit 
and the latifond:o which i.s". parcelled out .. as ·- rente.d uni.ts. Ma.ey of. these 
comparatively large holdings . are held .. by persons more properly de.fined as 
peasant farmers than as agrarian .cap-i.talists .. l 'Ihe. latter are, in- the: .main, 
absentee landlords. who have won- themse.lves an. ev-il reputation. which they 
wili. never be . abl.e : to li.ve down;~ not that they try to. 
'!he crop sharers referred to in Table· 2 above · are· .. called mezza.dr.i . or; 
collectively, the · mezzadria. The·. mezzadri are in . no way: the equivalent .o.f' 
the American southern sharecroppe.r. They are well-off' as a· clasa. and are a 
stabilizing element in the, social patters.- of' Italy. This is. especi~lly 
true of' the northern mezzadri, who hold farms. leased from. large · landowners 
1. Eina.udi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, n. 10, p. 27. 
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which they have cultivated as their own sometimes -for generations.! The 
system of mez.zadr:ia, which is . the Italian form of the French medieval .system 
of metayage, is based on long-term contracts between the owner and . the 
tenant providing for the sharing of. income and. expenses. For example, such 
a contract may provide that income · and expenses be shared on a . fifty-fJ.fty 
basis but with the owner · p•~.ying the taxes and owning both the livee.tock 
and the farm implements .• 2 
Since we are examining. e.ocial..pr.o;blems. .it i .s. important to note that the 
stabilizing influence of' the mezzadria eai:tends to about 20 ·)per· cent of 
Italian agrieul ture and. ie, indeed, thought. to be the most important form 
of' land holding in Italy. 
The landless agricl.lltur:al workers., the- , bra.ccianti, according. to Einaudi, 
the most insecure of those who earn a living in agriculture, are .generally 
at the mercy of the landowners, economically ~ e.peaking. It is this. class 
in Italian agriculture which is subject to unemployment. It forms the 
rural backbone of' the Communist Party.~ 
Because · of' widespread unemployment 1 t has become almost commonplace for 
the braceianti, who want at least to insure for themselve.s a reliable 
supply of food, to band together· and march upon Unt1sed portions of the 
latifondi and begin to cultivate t.h•m· Oftentimes the police try to stop 
them and there is violence and bloodshed and moree.ocial unrest. From. 1944 
to 19'49 the amount of land occupied in this fashion incre.ased from 10~000 
1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, P• 16. 
2. Of. Elizabeth Wiskemann, Italy, London, . Oxford University Press, 1947, 
PP• 4o-41; and UNRRA, Survey, P• 25. 
). Einaudi, Social Res.earch, XVII, March, 1950, p. 1~. 
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hectares to 150,000 heatares(one hectare equals2.471 acree).l 
Before leaving this s.ecti.on we mus.t examine more closely the· .syat8!Jl. of 
latifondi which encompass . 26. per cent of Italy 1a ae!"'eage withintheir wide 
domains. 'Ihese large estates are located . .in all parts of Italy. The. lati-
tondi of the North, however, t-end to be worked differently . from thos.e of 
the South, ao that. in effect the northern and southern latifondi are · quite 
different things-. 
In the North . the: prevailing form. of land tenure · seems• ·to u mo.r:e· along 
the lines of the me.zzadria system just deacribed. In the. South; on the 
other hand, the. latifondi are, worked mor.e on a tenancy basis than on a 
crop sharer basis.. That is to say, the tenants do not lease a consolidated 
farm for generations but rather- rent vari.o.us plots. on the esta.te· wh;ich 
appeal to them. or whi.ch. they: can afford for l.imited . peri.oda. '!hey · deal 
with the absent landlord 'a. agent .who gets a commissi.on based on the rent 
he can extract. The result is that the· tenant works .the . land. f'or .alL i.t ie 
worth to pay his rent, without giving. any thought to making permanent. im-
provements. The owner, on the. otherhand, looks at land. improvement as a 
futile and unprofitable task far beyond. his means. He is satisfied to make 
what profit he can without wasting it on improvements .2 The agent, .. me.an-
while, rents the land no.t according to a rational scheme of division of it 
into integrated areas of' maximum .productive · potential .. but with .a view to 
getting the most rent and therefore the maximum possible commise.ion.~ It 
is probably safe to say, then, that the mezzadria system properly pertains 
1. u.s. Department of Commerce, "Economic .Review. of Italy, 1949," Inter-
national Reference Service, July:, 1950, p. 2. 
2. Wiskemann, Fo.reign Affairs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, P• 87. 
;. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, PP• 16, 20. 
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to the North and the tenancy. and mixed. tenure system, te. the . South. But 
we are dealing. wif.h, general.Lti.e:a, . it must be. remembered.. It is foolish to 
suppose that all is welL in the. North. and all is chaos in the. South; or 
that every northern .la.tifond.isto. is an enlightened capitalist while every 
southern latifondieto is.-a feudal. ty%1lnt. 
Technology 
Besides the· aya.tem of land tenure,,. the , technelogi.c.a.L organization of the 
land al.so affects produc.tion and produc.ti:v.ity. Italy. is vastly def icient 
in agr.icul tural mechanization. . S.ixty-fi ve per cent of the tot al power in 
Italian agriculture is furnished, hy ;,600,000 draf.t animals. (mostly. draft 
ca• and oxen) which do 87 per cent. of all the work. Italy also has only 
182,000 motor unite- in its.· agri.cul turd sector, in the. form .. of' tractors, 
-engines and pump a. Compared to Am:er.i.oan ·agriculture, Italian agriculture 1 s 
mechanization . is-.at the .. pioneer , stase .1 
In 194 7 only - ten per · cent o:f .. the · ·arable land was.· being.· ploughe.d with 
tractors. Sixty per cent of the grain cr.op, whi.ch. . is. by far the most 1m-
portant crop from the point of view: of the Ital.ian di.et; was. be;ing 
threshed. mechanically.. One .. .and seven.-:tenths. per. cent of the· ar.able. land 
was being mechanically drained. and. .16.9 per cent was .. being irrigated.2 
The lat.ter. figures ~ give the - impr.ession. that Italy has a - suffici-ent 
irrigational .and drainage· development but a · very inade . qua:te. me.chaniza:t.Lon 
of' other a.spects of farming~• But . the. mechani.oal requirements: ot' a., country's 
agricultural system. are, after all., a function of the conditions peculiar 
1. J.R. Schwendeman, "Italy in theMediterranean," World Political Geo-
~, ed. G.E. Pearcy and. R.H. Fifield, N.Y., Crowe-ll Oompaey, 
1948, p. 20~. 
2. UNRRA, Survey, P• 25. 
to the country. It will be seen that in Italy, with its vast population, 
the real need. is not to shorten cultivation or harvesting time but to in-
crease the y~eld of the land and, indeed, the· amount of land itself. Thus 
although ploughing a.nd threshing may seem. to. be sadly in .need . of meohaniz-
ation while- drainage and irri.gation seem. to be • suff.ieiently develope.d, the 
very opposite is more nearly true.l On the · o.the.r · hand, it has. been aug-
gested that a general. increase in mechanization of f'arm work will. enable 
Italians to devote the f'eed and pasturag.e that is now consumed by draft 
animals to raising animals :for food. 2 Of course it mus.t . be kept in mind, 
however, that much of the rugged Italian land can only be cultivated by man 
and animals in any case. 
Overpopula.tion 
In the introduction it was: sugges·ted that Italy 1 s problem boils down to 
the simple fact of too maey. .people living. on too little. Giuseppe , Saragat 
is somewhat more specifi.c and .more emphatic on this · point. •r hope it is 
clear," he writes, "that the single fact of overpopulation is the obstacle 
that lies in every path of' progress.•; 
Yet, it is contended here that overpopulati,on i .e . essentially no.t a cause 
but rather a sympton. Furthermore, from the point of. view of' seeking to 
unfetter whatever forces of progress that Italy poeessea, overpopulation is 
not a single fact. but a .. combination of interrelated . :factors which may be 
called root causes of Italy 1s -dif':ficu1ty in achieving economic and social 
progress. The tables on the next page illus.trate this point. 
1. Of. Moore, Economi.c Demography, p. 109. 
2. Schwendeman, World Political Geography, p. 20;. 
;. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, P• 624. 
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TABLE ~ 
NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA IN CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 
19~5-~8, 19~9, 1946* 
Country 
Italy 
Belgium&Luxemb.ourg 
France 
United Kingdom 
Real. Income Per Capita 
in International. Units 
1955-~8 
National Income 
Per Capita in 
dollars 
1~9 1946 
14o 
261 
285 
468 
94 
517 
214 
655 
National Income 
in Billions of 
dollars 
1946 
10.2 
5·9 
18.0 
52.0 
*Source: Summarized from. Seymour Harr.is, European Recovery Program, Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Preas, 1948, p. 88. 
TABLE 4 
POPULATION AND POPULATION-DENSITY IN CERTAIN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1947* . 
Country Populati.on Persons Per Square Kilometer 
Italy 45,~75,000 150.7 
Belgium 8,421,000 276.0 
France 41,000,000 75.0 
United Kingdom 49,559,000 20~.0 
*Source: Summarized from U.N. Statistical Office, 
Statistical Yearbook, 1948, N.Y., 1949, 
PP• 26-27. All figures · are estimates. 
Table 4 indicates that Belgium and the United Kingdom in 1947 were mu.ch 
more 11 overpopulateda than Italy, if we e consider just the fact of the number 
of people per unit of area. . Yet th~ comparison of national income. per 
capita shows that both immediately before and imme.diately· after the war, 
not the overcrow.ded British and Belgians but the relatively uncrowded 
Italians were living in poverty. France· was even leaa crowded than Italy 
but enjoyed a higher national income per capita than Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The me.as.ure. of e.ffective. overpopulation; then, is neither th-e size of 
the country, nor the population, no.r . the relation between these two factors 
.alone. The proper measure is income, that is to say, the production of 
15 
goods and eerv1 cee. And in thi.s fact lie both the hope and the- hopele.as.ness 
of Italy's plight. The. hope is. to .. be found . in . the - fact that. Italy's over-
population can be attacked in. a positive (increased ou.tput) a:s well as in a 
negative (reduction. of populati.o.n) manner. We -wilL return. to this. point in 
subsequent sections -and. elaborate it further when we consider I .taly 1s in-
dus.trial sector. The: point. that is made, her.e is. that: overpopulation- is 
really a measure of the unused .. and in part unusable- excess of :human 
' 
resources. 
An aggravating factor in Italy 'a over.population p.r.o.blem. is the high rate 
of population growth. Italy 1 s population increases every year by from 
4oo,ooo to .45Q,OOO pe-ople, adding that much. mor.e a.tr.aln on an .economy that 
has not yet been able to absorb; a huger.backlog .of. human·. resources .• 
Italy 1 s .. oyerpop.ulation. has-. repercussions.: in:~ b.o:th :the . a gri.cul tural sector 
(in the f'orm. of surplus agricultural population) and in the industrial 
sector- (in the form of unemployment and: underemployment). The c.ombina.ti.on 
of an agrarian. economy- and overpopulation has given Italy a .- large reaervoir 
of agricultural exces.s. population. This means - that Italy has: more people 
engaged in agriculture-. than the-·. average,. Euro.pe.an; .country ·has,, yet its 
agrieul tural . sector produces no,. more.- than ... the average European· agr.i.cul tur-al 
sector. Thus in the. period, 19~1~19~5 Italy 1s agricul,tural surplus: popula-
tion was.- 27 per . cent,l i.e., 127 peopl& were produoing,J and-. sharing, .in 
Italy, '"ha.t only 100 people wer.e ·.producing and sha.r.ing·. in .. the a...ver.age 
European country (Estonia .. came. clos.eat- to approximating that average).. 
These figures show as vividly as. is necessary the low standard of living 
1. Moore, Economic Demography, pp. 62-6~. 
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that the Italians have long b~e:n tolerating.. Within. Italy itself, the 
southern agricultural sector has. a median average exces.s population of ;8. 7 
per cent; the northern, 24.9 per cent.l This, in view of the foregoing 
discussions, is no surprise and fits in with the North..,south pattern that 
has been developed. One startling ex caption . should be noted, however, 
namely, that the region of' .Lucania in the -South hatl.. the. lowest surplus 
population among the Italian. regions, . i.e., only 2.3 per cent.2 
SU!JlJllary 
The .chief characteristics of the. Italian agrarian. problem, then, are 
these. (1) Widespread. in:f'ertili.ty, espe.cially in the South. (2.) A system 
of land . tenure . which generally, but especially in the South, reduce.a .max-
imwn productivity and encourages depletion of the soil. (3) Inadequate 
mechanization, especially for irrigation and drainage purposes. (4} A ·~~­
lli.!!ge ·~ surplus agricultural population. A fifth factor may be mentioned, 
namely, the decisive lack of irrigation and electric power . in:the South. 
This is_due in large measure ·uponthe fact that there is · widespread de-
forestation which means there there are few. lakes and streams that can be 
depended upon f'or irrigation .and. hydroeleetrici.ty. Deforestation also . 
probably impairs the construction of artificial lakes. which the Government 
has undertaken, f'or if' rainwater is not to evaporate· 11fuickly:, a .forest 
floor is necessary to retain. it and allow a slow, steady runoff'. 
The striking. thing about these f'aete, however, is that they are all 
changeable. To the extent that they can be changed and. to the exte.nt that 
such change will result in. an increase. in agricul tur.al producti:vi ty, the 
Italian a grarian problem is solveable. We can now discuss some of the ideas 
j 1. Moore, Economic Demography, pp. 62-63. 2. Ibid. 
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that have been advanced as possible ,ways o.f attacking this problem. 
Discuasion of Al terna.tive S.olutions 
There are those who believe, . aswehave seen, that Italy's problem is 
overpopulatiom. It is suggested here, however, that Italy's problem is 
more one of low productiv.ity. 
The overpopulation theorists have· really set themselveaan impossible 
problem at aey rate. '!heir major solution tends to be, logically, to re-
- ~ 
duce Italy's population by direct means, other measur~- - being of secondary 
importance. But at this point. they ·rind themselves against a blank vall 
whieh they are · powerless to break down. 
TABLE 5 
ITALIAN EMIGRATION IN CERTAIN YEA..qs AND PERIODS* 
Period or Annual Total Period or Annual Total 
Year or Ave-rage Year or Average 
1906-1910 651,288 19~1-19~5 91,628 
1911-1915 548,612 19~6 41,710 
1916-1920 217,001 19~7 59,945 
1920 614,611 1938 61,548 
1921 201,291 ..... . ..... 
1921-1925 ~0,,264 1947 149,000 
1926-19~0 212,24_5 1948 174,000 
*Source:- SUliiDlllrized from Grindrod, New Italy, p.60; 
and Diamond Jenness, "Italy 1a . Demographie Crisis," 
Queens Q,uarterly, LVII,AUtumn., 1950, n. 1, p.274. 
It should be obvious by now that. Italy cannot relieve i .tself of over-
population by emigration. The table above (Table 5) shows that. the last 
time Italy was able to export . all of its present annual. increase in popula-
tion was in 1920. The nations· of the world during the . l9201 s and 19~0 1 s 
progressively restricted immigration quotas and it is highly unlikely that 
that trend will be radieally altered in the near future. '- will be shown 
in a later chapter, merely _the technieal difficulties of arranging for the 
migration,from Italy to another country, of a substantial number of people 
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are · enough to · comple.tely undermine. auch progr.ama, . even· when. both·. the 
sending and the· receiving countries: have only the · beet intention~r. 
The emigration rate. for . 1947 and 1948 shows quite . e.n improvement over 
the rate during, the 19)0 '.a.  We -may be sure -that the.se migrants were. 
reasonably healthy and gene.rally in the:-,·prime- of thecir produe;tive lives. 
Considering that Italy has - to raise them only to l .ose - them. when they could 
have started to "pay back11 , so ;:z to apeak, it. is de.batable, how much. Italy 
gained. by their going. Of courae the . remit.te.ncea of these Italian emigrants 
to their . families .in .. ltaly. will. help mi.ti,gate Italy's los.s .. ,- .end: perhaps 
even result. in a ne.t gain for Italy, considering the fact the..t these 
emigrants might have remained i .dle in Italy. 
Some writerslhave suggested, none too optimistically, the use of contra-
ception or even- a chang.e · in diet (to one that induces lees feeundi ty) as 
possible solutions to Italy's' overpopulation. Both of thesesolutione, of 
course, require radical changes in Italian habits and in Italian cultural 
patterns to be realistic for some time. 
It is suggested, then, that the reduction of Italian overpopulation by 
direct measures: ·is· es~rentially an;:.anci.llar.y pol icy:. The main attention 
should be focused on reducing o.ver-p·opulation by the i,nd~ect~'; means, i.e., 
increasing produeti.on. .Meantime. the o.utlets· for Italy 1 s .surplus population 
should be developed just as any other export market should be developed. 
!here are many routes through whi.ch ltaly can attack its problem of over-
population indirectly by increasing production. These· routes call for a 
combination -. of governmental. and. private enterprise and cooperati.on. . 'lhey 
call for efforts such as land redistribution and re-integration, extension 
1. Longmans, Green, 1949, 
Autumn, 1 0, p. 280. 
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of arable . land area, improvement of agricultural. techni.quea . and .. of . the _ 
ma~ketting structure. On all these points, however, one can find contro-
versy almost ad infinitum from the standpoints of need, practicability, 
possibility and even desirability. 
There can be no doubt in aeyone 1smind as to the. absolute -desirability 
of extending the amount of productive land. Such an achie-vement would b~ 
an unmixed blessing for it would absorb great amounts of the current excess 
population. It would also create employment both during the land preparatio 
stage and thereafter. It would also increase · the total food-pr.oducing 
capacity of the country. The quest.ion is, however, is such a thing 
possible? 
-Oar~o Sforza thinks it is. Speaking specifically of the South, he says, 
If I did not fear - to seem paradoxical, I would. add ... tha.t one. of my 
most profound reasons fer optimism .about the future of italy is that all 
the great countri-es of Europe are full- but not Italy; we have within 
ol!Z own confines an Empire, in a. certain sense- colonial, but whose de-
velopment and seeurity do not depend on intimi.dating· :the natives, but 
rather on its own natives, our. co-nationals who are among the most in-
telligent and wide-awake o.f the peoples of Europe •1 
Mario Einaudi thinks that at least the. fertile coastal belt of I ta.ly 
could be extended further inland.2 Wiskemann, too, thinks that the.· amount 
of productive land. in Italy can be increased,- citing the malarial swamps 
of Calabria.; And Giuee.ppe S.arage..t quotes Professor -Manlio Rossi,-Doria who 
believes that some of the pre.sently arid, '!mde.veloped lands have abundant 
water not far beneath the surfaee.4 
1. Sforza, Italy and the Italians, p. 98. 
2. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, p. 18. 
;. Wiek.emann, . Forei-gn .Affairs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, p. 90. 
4. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, p. 624. 
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On the other hand there. are wri te.rs who have no such hopes as those :: Juat 
expressed for Italian agriculture• Diamond Jenness:, for . one, . states., 
So extravagant ••• have been some of the -newspaper aeseetions that the 
people in the outside world, and. not a few, of the Italians. themselves, 
are beginning .to assume, first, that Italy posses.aeshugeareas of 
waste land that could profitably. be brought under cultivation; and s-econd 
that it requires only courage and the expenditure · of a . moderate amount · 
of money · to colonize these lands with hundreds of thousands of industri-
ous f'armers who today are idle and. famishing. Unhappily, neithe-r of 
these assumptions is true.l 
The authors of an. UNRRA survey of · Italy: agree,· with . thi.s. viewpoint, 
asserting that Italian agriculture'e · capacity to absorb its .ur.plus popu-
lation is negligible.2 But Moore, in an. equally incisive survey, seems to 
take the position that Italian agri.culture can-. indeed .more than absorb 1 ts 
excess population, given, of course, certain changes ·.~ 
Only time can tell who is right. It me.y be mentioned that Jenness is 
is. being unfair in ascribing to serious students of the problem the idea 
that only a moderate expenditure can accomplish. their proposed goals. It 
may be Jll.e:ationed, too, that. land reclema.tion is no new thing in· Italy, .and 
that a recent project in Sardinia,ha.s wiped. ... out malaria·.in= that ieland 
making room, in the near future, f'or a million Italians. 4 
We have already s.een. that the. economi"c orga_Tlization of agriculture 
affects the productivity of the· agricultural sector. We have .also seen 
that the economic organization . eventuates in a pattern of social claeees 
and that therefore a gricultural problems . bec.ome soci.al problems. This is 
particularly true in the matter of agrarian reform. 
l. Jenn~ea, ~eens· quarterly, LVII, Autumn, 1950, pp. 279-271. 
2. UNRRA, Survey, P• 65. 
;. Of. Moore, Economic Demography, pp. 70-74. 
4. "Victory in Sardinia," editorial, New York Times, July 16, 1950, Sec. 
4, p. 8. 
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A study of possible alternatives tor sQlving .. Itaiy'e· land dia,tribution 
puzzle . is a study . in vici.ous. circles .• . As . we have. ·seen, . if. ~. you divid.e up 
the estates you m1 tigate agrarian . d±seontent but you lose the. economiee of 
size with respect to much needed. land improvement, mechanization,. other 
elements . of . capital f .ormation (buildings., wareho.uaes., etc.), the rotation 
of crops, etc. It should. be mentioned; howev-er, that some , es.tate.a.·. are· 
lying idle · anyhow and their re.diviiion will mean. that they will become pro-
ductive. An alterna.tive could be s .tate-impr-ovement of them. as uni.te or 
improvement by the.·ir owners. In this. way- theae .eatatea could become even 
more productive. But agrarian· dis.content would continue at least in· the 
f.or.eseeable future, for with une1J1ployment constantly> s.tar.ing· him. in the face 
the peasant wants at least a plot of · land of hi:s own so, that ·he ' .. can· take. 
concrete steps toward assuring himaelf of a food supply. Then aga·i'n, a 
large estate facilitate& mechanization ·whieh ;Would- .eventual.ly increase · 
production . but which. at present . wo.uld. only diaplace. agricultural workers 
whom, as we · shall see, Italian .. .indus.try cannot ye~ abe orb be.cause it is 
already faced with a . grave, unemp.loyment problem. 
The crux of the problem of. redivi.s.ion is that: two short-run goals are 
equally desirable immediately but requireconfli.cting. poli:ciesfor their 
fulfillment. These . ends: are increased production· and. incre.aaed· peaeal'lt 
ownership of the land. The means to. these ends , ar.e , compatible only to a 
certain point ('which is very quickly reached) whence they begin . to cancel 
out . each other.1s gains .• . The problem of agrarian reform .. is one where · the 
need of the economic rationalization: of agriculture · is very quickly eon-
fronted with the. need for t ha political .rationalization,. so: .to .. . speak, of 
agriculture. It is a social problem. with no completely satisfactory 
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solution. 
It eeeme to be accepted nov that some redlstribution. muet take place. 
At t.he very least such a program will mitigate , agrarian .discontent. Ac.tuall , 
it will intensity cultivation of some prea.ently unworked estates. There is 
a controversy as to which should come first, redia.tributi.on or improvement. 
Einaudi admits that increased production should be the first consideration 
but he notes t.hat the present landlords are an obstruction to this. There-
fore, he concludes, it is beet to redivide the land first. 1 Sforza points 
out, however, that to give peasants land which has not· first been improved 
enough to provide him with a reas.onable living defeats · the very end of re-
distribution.2 He has in mind the faet that only the Government possesses 
the wherewi thall to make certain land.s fertile enough to support life. 
Einaudi and Sforza would probably agree on one point, namely, that 
estates which are productive and the productiveness of which redivision 
would actually reduce should be left alone. Einaudi,. as we saw earlier, 
states that most of the · northe.rn latifond.i- are worked in such a way. that 
redivision cannot improve their productivity. In fac.t the latifondi 1n the 
North generally are· justified on the grounds that they mak.e the best use 
of irrigations.! and drainage facilities.3 
The Italian Constitution under Article. 44 provides for State improvement 
of the land, for the redistribution of large estates and for the re-inte-
gration of the m.a.zw fragmentary holdings into economically profitable 
larger holdings. The Italian Government, as we shall see, has, with America: 
1. Einaudi., Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, p. 22. 
2. Sforza, Italy and the Italians, p. 98. 
; • Of. Einaudi, Social Resear.ch, ~VII, March, 1950, p. 15. 
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aid, embarked on all of these progra.ms at once. This . is probably the least 
economical way of solving Italy's agrarian. problem. But all . things oon-
sidered it appears. to be. the only way. Thus . speaking specifically of the 
South, Sara.ga.t. states. that . the present .. program . of the Goverl¥!lent 
••• proposes to make over the large landed estates of the south, not 
into big commercial farms. but into small peasant holdings. A foreign 
observer may say that this is not a. radical enough answer. Th.oae "of' us 
who live with the problem .know that it is the only one posdble.l 
'!hue far we have discussed the controversial measures that mus.t be · taken 
to improve Italian a.gricul ture. There are also non-controversiaLmeaaures 
whioh are essential to the attainment. of all the de.sir.able. ends: we have 
spoken of. Livestock, :f'or example, must be increased. and its breeding. im-
proved. Besides providing a. nece3sary supplement to th.e ·unbalaneed Italian 
diet of cereals and vegetable. fats . by supplying meat; and besides , providing 
draft power in lieu of. machinery, livestock will also help to ree.:tore tl!le 
natural balance between plant and animal life· in agriculture whi.ch: is 
important for land fertility. Animal husbandry as of 1947 was ineff'i.cient. 
It used up ;8 per ce:at of Italy 1s agricultural land for feed but contributed 
only 25 per cent of the total agricul tu.ral produc.tion· in the. Italian econ-
OJey".2 One reason for this, however, may be the. fact. we have.,. already noted, 
namely, that livestock is used mainly for power rather than for food. 
Productivity can als0 be aided with a minimum of effort merely by using 
improved strains of seeds.; We shall speak later of efforts to educate the 
Italian farmer (who is not characterized, incidentally, by a love: of change 
and innovation) in the use of hybrid corn. This may seem to be only a minor 
l. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, p. 621. 
2. UNRRA, Survey, P• 25. 
;. Moore, Economic Demography, p. 109. 
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improvement until we learn that together with barley, oats and .similar 
eoar!ie grains, corn is grown on almo.st five million acres of Italy 1s arable 
1 land .• 
Food marketing is an eseential part of a heal thy agri.cul tura.l economy'. 
Italy .needs more and .better means of' transportation and communications, im-
proved storage and shipping facilities. In one southern locali.ty where 
this writer lived in the early 19~0 1 s the peasants had to gorge themselves 
on all kinds of fresh f'rui.ts and vegetables during the ri.pening- seas~:ms. 
Much of this produce merely rotted due to the- complete absence. of' refrig-
eration, part of this was used to feed what little livesto.ck. there was. 
There was one market place for selling the produce, but since everyone- gr.ew 
the same things the, market was. always glutted and growing. the produce was 
hardly worth the eff ort. It may: be added that the surplus. of fresh vege-
tables might not have been so hard to. take had. there been . a little meat to 
go with them. 
On the need · of marketing faciliti.es there is little or no controversy. 
But there is a controversy on the subject of price-as a factor in marke-ting 
and agriculture. In connection .with this subject some- of the I talian 
Deputies from the . South. feel that the Italian. Government is:. paying to.o much 
attention to industry and none to agriculture. A Deputy from Apulia 
recently called -for a "holy crusade in defense of the rights. of Italian 
agriculture. n2 (Such an outburst, incidentally, 1e probably partially in-
duced by the sou.thernere 1 feeling of inferi.ori ty to the northerners. ) The 
l. u.s. Department of State, Committee of European Economic Cooperation, 
Technical Reports, II, 1947, p. 61. -
2. Arturo Maresca.lchi, nNote di Agricoltura," Nuova. Antologia, Dec., 1950, 
p. 421. 
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Government 1 s policy of keeping prices down, which we shall examine more 
fully in a subsequent chapte.r, i .e considered by some. ·as the main .obstructi.on 
in . the path of progress for the . agrarian South. Thus one writer maintains, 
Il problema. meridionale e ~n- problema a gricola, problema di prezzi 
perche quando i prodotti sonopagatisufficienteme:n.te 1 contadini non 
solo vivono ma progediscono, come hanno dimo.strato. di saper fare negli 
ultimi anni in cui. 1 prezzi :f'urono rimunerati:vi.l 
'!hue far we have spoken interms . of domestic. marketing. '!here is · also 
the . pro.blem of developing. foreign maxketa .for Italy's produce. as, an ee-sentia · 
element of a healthy agrioultural1. sector. We shall discuss this in con-
nection with Italy 1s foreign. trade. in general .• 
At present Italian agricultur.e , cannot. give · employment. to all those who 
depend upon it. Even in the future.· when its capacity to abs.orb its excess 
population is improved i .t is . . very unlikely that agricul.ture can . absorb the 
annual increase in the working . force. Furthermore,. provision . should be 
made for the seasonal agrioul tural worke.rs. Einaudi suggests . the. fostering 
of small industries in the towns - to help meet these needs.2 Bu.t industry 
in general must absorb the bulk of surplus workera in the fu.ture. Further-
more, industry must be .improved to give Italy a balanced economic develop-
ment. i'/e must now, therefore, turn our attention to th.e industrial sector 
of Italy. 
But first, one final word on the , subject of this .. chapter. So far we 
have dealt with Italy's problems mostly in terms of agricultural economics, 
1. Marescalchi, Nuova Antologia, De.o., 1950, P• 420. Translation: "The 
problem of the South is an agri.cul tural problem, a. problem of prices 
because when produce is paid for well enough the farmers not only 
make a livin&:bbut th~y also .progrese, as they have -demonstrated they 
knov how in the last years when prieee were remunerative." 
2. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, P• 25. 
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inter jeoting at times the connecti.on . be tween economic proglems and soci·a l 
problems. We follow the. same technique in . Chapter 2. As. a ma..tter of .fact., 
however, every problem and every al.ternative i .e · affected with . social implic-
ations. We shall fully develop t h is· ne-xus. in Chapter ~. What has been 
established in this . chapter is . the · natur.e of the economic strue.ture that 
underlies Italian agrarian society. 
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CHAP.'IER . U 
THE INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM 
Italy 1e Res.ources 
Although Italy is a predominantly agricul tur.al country it has what is 
conaide~ed an import~t industrial sector.l In 19~6 tha industrial sector 
of Italy's econolllY' employed around ~~ per cent of. the total labor force of' 
around 18.~ million persons · and produced from '0 to ~4 per cent of the 
total national income. (Agriculture employed 48 per cent of' the labor 
force but produced -only ~6 per cent of' the -nati.onal inc.ome.)2 
Most of Italy 1s industriaL sector is concentrated in the North where 
there is a. good suFply of' hydroelectric power.' Around 75 per cent of the 
industrial plant survived the late war intact. 4 
The indus.trial potential of a :- country is intimately related to the 
mineral wealth which .lies .at i .te .disposal. Table 6 below indi.eates the 
extent of Italy 1s mineral res.our.oee. It also illustrates why -any study of 
Italy inevitably leads to the following conclusion. 
1. The emphasis, however, remains on agriculture. Steel production is a 
good indicator of industrialization. In1948 per -capita. pro4uction 
of' steel in Italy was 52 kilograms; in Sweden, 290; in Britain, 270; 
in Belgium, 250; in Yugoslavia,. 195; in France, 182; in Spain, 18,. 
cf. La Produzione in Italia, (Milan), Feb., 1950, (unpaginated.). 
2. UNRRA, Survey, p. 65; of. also ibid .• , p. 66. ~. ~., p. 69. 
4. Ibid., p. 65. It should be noted; however, that transportation, in-
cluding harbor facilities, were reduced to 25 per cent of the. p~e­
war ca.paci ty and the merchant marine (an -important means of earning 
foreign exchange and redressing an unfavorable · balance · of payments) 
was reduced to ten per cent of pre-war tonnage. Of. Ibid. 
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The outstanding fact in Italy 1s industrial_ economy is the country 1.s 
marked deficiency of' raw materials and fuels. Not one of the key raw 
materials such as coal, mineral oils, iron, lumber, cotton or copper is 
found, or can be produced in Italy in any .signi£ican.t . quantity. 
Other basic materials such as hides, phosphates and wool also are in 
short supply. T'ne relative abundance of su~phur, aluminum, mercury, 
zinc and lead ores is not such as to compensate for the foregoing 
deficieneies.l 
TABLE 6 
ITALI~~ PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN MINERALS AND FUELS, 1938* 
(thousands of' metric tons) 
Production % of world 
Commodity** in 1938 production-
Antimony 
Bauxite 
Iron ore 
Lead ore 
Magnesite 
Manganese 
Mercury 
Zinc ore 
Coal 
Lignite -
520.0 
40.0 
(crude) 6.0 
ore 15.0 
2.~ 
88.0 
960.0 
1,322.0 
Petroleum (crude) 13.0 
930.0 
397.0-
, Pyrites 
Sulphur 
0.4 
0.4 
44 ~4 '· 
4.7 
0.1 
0.6 
8.0 
12.0 
Comments 
3rd in Eur.ope. 
6th in world · (but Istrian depo.si ts 
one of two main ones in Italy, los 
by peace treaty. ) 
3rd in Europe; low in relation to 
big producers like u.s. 
Highest in the world. 
3rd in Europe• 
Equivalent to 265,000 metric tons 
of · coal. 
Albania produced 147,000 metric 
tons in 1938. 
4th in the world. 
2nd only to the u.s. 
* Source: Grindrod, The New Italy, p. 62. These figures show Italian 
mineral production in a relativ.ely "normal" year. 
** Chromium, copper, molybdenum, nickel; tin, tungsten, vanadium are either 
absent in Italy or present only in negligible quantities, cf. ibid. 
The chief industrial resources -of Italy are the hydroelectric power in 
the North and a reservoir of skilled, cheap labor.2 
The. most important industries in order · of their importance are-engineer-
ing, textile, electric, food procesai.ng, me.tallurgy and chemical,- all of 
which combined account for about 70 per cent of Italy 1s to.tal industrial 
production.3 
1. UNRRA. Surv~L-h 68. 3. Ibid. 
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Italian Industry and. International Trade 
\'l'hen a country does not itself have the raw · materials . and . power supply 
whi.ch an active induatrial. s.ector needs, it must look for them abroad. 
This means that such a country is extremely dependent on international 
trade eo far as its industry is concerned. The importance of foreign trade 
to Italy 1s industrial. sector can readily be demons.trated. . In 1938 impor.ts 
of industrial raw materials and fuels accounted for 48 per cent of the 
total imports, and imports of semi-finished. industrial pr.oducts for an ad-
ditional 22 per cent.l 
On the other ·hand, Italy's indus,try has ·. been· an important factor.- in 
Italy's foreign trade. Since the ·turn of the century finished. industrial 
products have been a major item. in Italy 1s exp.orte~ the. iJ:!lportance o:f . which 
increased steadily up to the beginning of World War II.2 
TABLE 7 
FINI SRED PRODUCTS AS A % OF ITALY'S TOTAL EXPORTS 
FOR OERT~IN YEARS* 
.!!!!:. Per. Cent 
1913 . • • • • 31.8 
1922 . • • • • 33·7 
1928 • • • • • 41.9 
1934 . • • • 35·4 
1938 • • • • • 41.6 
* Source: Summarized from UNRRA, Surve:t:. p. 410. 
Italy 1s foreign trade has continuously expanded, gene.rally speaking, 
since Italy 1s unification.3 But Italy has also had an . t.Ulfavorable balance .. 
of trade which has obtained constantly since 1900 except in the period 1939-
1943 (when Italy couldn 1t import wha.t it needed anyway. )4 The exp_ansion of 
1. UNRRA, Survey, p. 65. Of. also p. 410. 
2. Ibid., Table 20, P• 408. 
3· Ibid., p. 448 . 
4. Of. Ibid., P• 401 and p. 449. 
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Italy 1s foreign trade, the · continuing deficit in_ ita, trade · balance .and the. 
increasing proportion". of imports . . of industrial raw., materials to. the. total 
value of imports reflec.t the .increasing indus.trialize..ti.on. of'. Italy and t he 
rising living standards of that cotmtry .1 But 1 t must be no.ted. that the 
export of finished industrial products navel' re-.ched . the point where. they 
paid . for the imports of' the requi.site· raw materials;.,2 Furthermore, the · ex-
port of all other products (such. as. agricultural products, raw-materials 
such as sulphur and mercury, etc.) couldn~t make up the deficit. 
Up to World War I receipts .from external sources such as emigrants' 
remittances, tourist expenditures, freight and shipping, insur,ance, fees 
from transit traffic in. Italian. ports., copyrights, etc., all ofwirhich are 
"invisible . exporte 11 . in in.ternational trade, more than covered. the deficit 
in Italy 1s balance of payments.~ After 1929 income · from. these ''invisible 
exports 11 declined steadily due · to the · depression . and. the · exchange controls 
which. the na.tions of the. world increasingly imposed.4 
Another important fact about . Italy 1s position in respect to foreign 
trade is that Italy 1e. impor.ts are generally of an essential character while 
her exports are generally. o.f a , non-essential nature. This .. means . that while 
Italy 1s demand for imports is inelastic the demand for her· exports is quite 
elastic.? This fact, combined with the fact of Italy 1 s chronic unfavorable 
bUance of trade and her dependence on "invisible" exports" to make up the 
deficit in her balance of payments make Italy highly sensitive, ae far as 
1. UNRRA, 
4. Ibid., 
5· Ibid., 
--and 
Survey, 
p. ~97· 
P• 45'+. 
caused a 
2. Ibid. 
The Fascist attempt to change. this - condition failed 
serious deterioration of the Italian economy., of. ibid. 
her standard of living and her · industrial health are cancerned, to the· 
level of world trade. No single. country can significantly· influence· this 
lev:el, i.e., induce it to remain so high that goode and services and f'ore.ign 
exchange flow relatively freely in .amulti-lateral pattern· financed by a 
liberal credit structure. I .taly., largely lacking an indigenous basis for a 
powerful modern . economy, is comple.tely at the mercy of the .vagaries of 
international trad~, as far as its. industry is concerned. Consequently 
when, with the. end of World . War !!,world trade .. came·· to a virtual standstill 
Italian industry reached the very·· depthe of depression. 
Unemployaent 
Since the end of the war therehas been a chronic unemployment in Italy 
of at least two million workers. '!hie figure is based on. the official 
registers for those unemployed seeking state. unemploymentc ..aid. I:t does . not 
include the unemployed who fail to register, the par~.time workers, or the 
great amount of disgui.sed unemployment which exists due to the redundant 
labor on the farm and in the factory. 
The . distribution of unemployment. in Italy arouncL1946 was: as. follows 
(keeping in. mind that there is more unemployment than official. figures 
indicate). Fifty-nine per cent of the to:ba.l registered unemployment was 
purely industrial unemployment, 14 per cent was -agricultural, and the rest 
miscellaneous and commer.cial.l For our purp.oses it is · permissible to treat 
all non-agricultural unemployment as indu.s.t rial unemployment . for such .non-
. agricultural activity as commerce and bahking, insur.ance, transportation 
and the like may be considered as related closely to industry and there~ore 
1. UNRRA, Survey, P• 208. 
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in general a part of industr,r.l 
Geographically, around 71 per cent of' tha . total unemployment was con-
centrated in the North and Central parts of Italy.2 
Unemployment in Italy is very significant for two reasons-• First, it is 
the f .inal product of a . combination of objective· end subjective- factors, some 
controllable, some uncontrollable, by the Italians.. Second, unemplayment 
in Italy is a link between the economic and. the. socio-political preble~ of 
Italy. We shall deal with the . latter point in the· next chapter. 
'!he immediate obje.ctive. fact.ors which have. caused .unemployment in Italy 
since the war have been (1) overpopulation and (2) inability to use exist-
ing indus.trial capacity. 
Overpopulation has already been treated. It is a problem. .which· haei been 
and will continue for same time to be largely outs.ide -the. realm of' ltalie.n 
self-help. There are just too many people in Italy for industry to cope 
with. Keld Christensen obser.ves, 
Indust rial employment ••• has never been able to increase -f aster than 
the increase in the labor force; consequently unemployment has for many 
years been a chronic malady though sometimes hidden by certain economic 
and political policies under the Fascists.~ 
The solution to this particular problem nevertheless exists,. as we shall 
see, in the realm of international cooperation and can e.t ·leaat mitigate 
the undesirable effects of overpopulation on employment in Italy. 
Inability to use existing industrial capacity is i tsel.f · due to e. com-
bine.tion of factors the chief ones being the difficulty of obtaining 
1. Of. Keld Christensen, Italy's Economic Policy, (Foreign Service Insti-
tute Monograph Series), May, 1950, P• 2. 
2. UNRRA, Survey, P• 206. 
~. Christensen, Italy 1s E.conomic Policy, p. 2. 
necessary raw materials abroad with only the limited amount of dollars 
available to Italy and with prices at a high level; and the Government's 
policy of maintaini.ng tight credit controls and of keeping public invest-
ment outlays at a minimum in order not to provoke further inflation. We 
shall return to this point again. 
The extent of unused capacity may be indicated by the following figu,res. 
The government-owned mechanical industries, which account for a. very large 
part of. the italian. industrial sector, have been running at only from- 25 to 
50 per cent of capac.i ty .1 The textile industry has been operating a. t only 
60 per cent of capacity; the non-ferrous indus.triee, at 50 per cent; the 
shipyards, at 27 per cent; the truck-producing industries, at ;; per cent; 
the tractor-producing industries, at 50 per cent.2 
Even these figures migh.t well be revised downward. Employment practices, 
for example, seeking to mitigate the explosive socio-political situation 
created by large· munbers of unempLoyed workers roaming the ei ty streets in 
hopeless boredom, and. at times seeking to rationalize the · various.· industries 
vacillate between padding the · payrolls with unpro.duo.tive · workers (in 1946 
this was done by governmental order) and instituting masa layoffs. 
Unemployment and Interna.tional Trade · 
A major cause for induatrial. idleness in Italy is, of course, the- low 
level of world trade. Since .. . the war the currencies of the va.ri.ous nations 
have become inconvertible into each other. The only: exceptions to this rule 
are the American dollar and, to a much lesser extent, the British pound, ihe 
1. Arnaldo Cortesi, "E.O.A. Aides Score Rome Fiscal Policy," New Yo.rk 
Times, Oct. ;, 1950, P• 19. 
2. Aylmer Vallance, "Report on Italy II," New Statesman and Nation, XL, 
Oct. 28, 1950, P• ;85. 
;4 
Swiss frank, and the Belgian frank. As a result of this . situation interna-
tional trade has been carried on largely on a bilateral barter basis. To 
put it in star:kly simple terms, these oondi tiona. result in exactly the same 
situation that would obtain if every .American . citizen. could no longer. us.e 
money and had to somehow earn material things like bags of coal or baxes 
of iron ore or spare automobile parts in. order to exchange them· for equally 
material things like socks or food. · The city laborer in this situation 
would starve until. someone who owned a coal pit, let us say, would let him 
earn some coal to exchange· for food. Italy is in the position of that 
laborer. Italian- industry, which de.pends almo.st entirely on international 
trade both for raw materials and for markets, has .been hit even ha-rder 
than the industries· of countr-ies · which have some. valuable primary raw 
materials to barter away, euch asBritain, France, Belgium, or the Nether-
lands. To use another metaphor, countries. wi.th a surplus. store.' of in-
dustrial raw materi.ale are-, to. that. extent, "seli':-start:ers-" in. the machineey 
of world trade. Countries like Italy are merelyf'lywheels or connecting 
cogs. 
Fundamentally, then, according .. to the theme . wehave developed; Italy's 
indlistrial criai.a is symptomatic of' the absence in Italy of' an indi-genous 
basis f'or industry to the extent that foreign trade is the very life 'Dlood 
of' that indus.try. 
Added to the -fundamental natural affliction des .cribed above are the man-
made blights. of international trade- which also take. a heavy toll, of. lt.alian 
well.-b.eing. These include quotas, fees and taxe.a~ .red tape, .bi~ateraliam., 
tariffs, hi.g}L .prices and similar prac.ti:ces~ In addition, Italy 1s · domesti-c 
market ie too small to support an appreciabl.e amount of industrial activity. 
Italians hav& long been·· accustomed- to a low standard o.f . living and an habi-
tually low level of conswnption.l The low- level of consumption; although a 
habit, is also reinforced. by objective. factors. Keld. Ohristens.e.n ... S.tates 
that low consumption i.n Italy is due. to (1) extreme. poverty and (2) extreme 
inequality of wealth. 
Of the total family income. in 1948 of 6,700 billion. lire, two-hundred 
and sixty thousand families (or 2.4 per cent of the total 10.7 million 
families) received 1,155 billion lire or about 17 per cent. of .the total; 
six-hundred and. forty-eight thousand families (6.0 per cent of the. total 
families) received 1, 774 billion . lire or over 25 per cent of the total 
national family income; at .the . •ottom of the scale about 60 per cent of 
the total Italian .families - received 2,066 billion lire or )0.8 per cent 
of the tota1.2 - · 
Unemployment and Business Psychology 
A second reason for Italy •s i .dle industrial capacity is psychologi.cal. 
There apparently has- been a s.teady flight of capital . .frOIIL Italy to Latin 
America. '!hie .largely accounts for the lack of net new priva-te. inves-tment 
in Italian industry. The dearth of private investment is , unders.tandable . 
(although not necessarily excusable) in view of the almo.st cons.tantly. 
political and economic situation in Italy, a situation. which is no.t at all 
reassuring to the proe.pecti.ve investor. Aylmer Vallance .charges · tha.t .. those 
individuals who do invest. in I.taly sink their funds into the production of 
luxuries, where theprofits are · quick and big, ra.ther than .into the .pro-
duction. of essential reconstruction equipment.? S1i.ch practices,. of course, 
may be condemned on the grounds of mi.sdirection of investment, but this 
case suffers badly if the luxuries are actually being sold abroad • 
. l. UllRRA, Survey, p. 68. 
2. Christensen, Italy's Economic Policy, p. 11. Also Table l, Appendix 1. 
~. Vallance, New Statesman .and Nation, XL, Oct. 28, 1950, p. ~85. 
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Unemployment and Governmental. Policy· 
A very large part· of Italian industry is owned o.r controlled by the 
State •1 Thus gove-rnmental fi seal. policy can.: determine the course of events 
in I tal ian industry in gener.al. At the, end . of' the war·: the I tali an Govern• 
ment was -f'aeed with a . gal.).Oping inflation which would ha\!e brought· economic 
-~- . i_. . 
and e.ocial chaos to Italy if there had been no . help from the outside. The 
first step that the Government took. on. the road .. to . re.covery, th.eref'.ore, 
was to inati.tute. a · series of anti-inflation measures such as tight credit 
controls; capi.tal levies, . and. heavy excise and. sales taxe.s. - Even the 
Italian Treasury was enjoined from borrowing from the Bank of Italy except 
by special legisiation.2 
Despite "pres.sur.es · on · tha Government . to provide ·. work for the.·. unemployed, 
to improve agricultural conditions, and to help in the further industrial-
ization of the country, u3 the Italian Government held the · line. and pre!Jsed 
its restricti.ve fiscal policy so that its primary objective, to stop in-
flation . .and stabilize Italian currency; was indeed attained. But only at 
the price of increased unemployment.4 
Unfortunately, around J~ 1950 inflation once. more began to aff'lict 
Italy despite the Government's . restrictive efforts because the general .price 
rise at that time everywhere in the world was bound to be reflected in 
Italy 1s domestic economy (because of its great dependence on world trade). 
1. Christensen, Italy's. Economic Policy, p. 15. 
2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 
European .Recovery Program Hearings, Part I, Washington, 1948, p. 425. 
~. Ibid. . 
4. cortesi, New York !imes, Oct. 3, 1950, P• 19. 
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The absence of price controls -was e.notherfaotor-. Meantime, as already 
pointed out, Italy still has a vast unemployment problem. 
Inflation 
Inflation is not due altogether. to external .influences · or even to ob-
jective. forces. Prices .are determined by market conditione to a point. 
Beyond that point additional markups may or may not be made according to 
the policy of' tha seller. High pri.oes, of course, reflect, to some _ extent, 
the inefficiencies which are characteristic of a.n:r stricken industr.i.al 
sector. But in Italy ID.a1W industriali.ets are taking advantage· of law 
production to raise their profi-ts . beyond all re.asonablenes,a. · Very few 
firms, it has been· charged, attempt to reduce cos-ts and .increase production, 
while industrial profits have run as high as 200 to 500 per cent.l 
To the extent that such high profits (plus the cos.ta of ineff iciency) 
raise prices on goods for export Italian products will be driven from the 
competiti-ve world market• The resultant l .osa. of markets (and therefore of 
foreign exchenge) eventually will have adverse effe.cts on Italian recovery. 
But the mo-re immediate and pernicious eff.ect of high profits and low pro-
duction is that they foster inflation in the -domestic economy thus directly 
increasing the misery of the Italian people by further reducing their 
already low buying power. 
Howard K. Smith describes how inflation in wholesale priee.s b mtU. ti-
plied 1.n its. effect on retail prices. I>i'any unemployed, with nothing else 
to do, pool their small remaining. capital and become .. middle-men, buying 
goods from still other middle-men and selling them at a profit, perhaps to 
1. "High Profits in Italy," Times (London), Oct. 20, 1950, P• ;. 
;a 
still other middle-men. . Thus the inflationary spiral goes on ita inexorable 
heart-breaking w~y .1 
In late: 1946 the coat of food in Italy had risen from )) to )6 times 
that of 19)8 while wages had risen by only half as much.2 'lhe. peak of the 
inflation was reached in mid-1947 when the wholesale. price· index, taking 
19)8 as the base .year (19)8 equals . 100 per cent) reached. above 6,000. per 
cent. At that time the French wholesale price · index on the same base 
stood at juat under· 1,000 per oent; the Austrian, at about 450 per cent; 
the English, at about 200 per cent.? The trend after mid-l~~-7 began to 
decline due to the severe anti-inflationary meas.ures taken by the Govern-
ment (as was described above). Inflation began to appea-r e.ga1n, however, 
in mid-1950, as has been explained, reflecting a general. world tr.end. 
What does inflation. mean to the. individual Italian? The· Milan Chamber 
of Commerce reports that as of Jun&, 1950 the average- f ull-time wage of a 
semi-skilled worker supporting his wife and thr.ee. chUdr.anunder. el~ven 
years of age was- only one-half the required living exp_enees.4 The balance, 
it would seem, ismadeup in malnutrition and extra work. 
Hence the postwar· indus.trial s.itua.tion in. Italy: a shortage· of raw 
materials reinforced in its effects by the low level of international trade, 
a large amount of idle. industrial plant, mass unemployment., inflati.on, and 
a dearth of both. foreign and dom.es.tic markets. 
1. Smith, State of Europe, p. 210. 
2. Richard Goold-Adame., "Recons.tructi.on in Italy," Quarter~y Review, OOLXXV, 
Jan., 1947, P• 5). 
). E.C.A., Third Report to Congress, Washington; · Government Printing Office, 
1949, P• 1). 
4. Aylmer Vallance, 11 Report on. Italy I," New Statesman an!i Nation, XL, Oct. 
21, 1950, P• )69. 
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Alternatives 
There is, first of all, the question. of. whether Italy can· achieve a 
powerful industrial econcm,y, one that will put. the. Italian lire, for ex-
ample, on approximately the same ... footing with the · Belgian frank. (It is 
taken for granted that. a moderate . industrial sector is neeea·sary in any' 
case.) Such an economy wwld seem. to be desirable because, aside from ab-
sorbing some of the agricultur,al. overpopulation (once its own unemployment 
is taken care · of) 1 t would also help rais.e the present low standard of 
living and . tend to urbanize the·. country, both of. which developments might 
well contribute to a lower .rate · of population growth. 
But Italy lacks the very. foundations of heavy industry. Its chief in-
dustrial power supply, hydroelectricity, is suited, to the lighter, dispersed 
industries, not to heavy inclustr.ies such. as steel-making · which requires 
coking coal.l 
Wilbert E. Moore, speaking of the. economies : of Eaetern and. Southern 
Europe genera·lly, thinks .that the.ee, countries do need, a.s . much industrializ-
ation 11 as is- objectively feasible, 11 however.2 He s.tate.s ,what appear to be 
some - very sound. conditions. for industrialization which are quite applicable 
to Italy. 
The foregoing argument implies a, considerable -measure of government 
directio.n and planning if economic modernization is.· to be achieved. How-
ever, the par.ticular circumstances prevai.ling in the. European . agrarian 
regions, and especia.l.ly in Eastern Europe, argue agains,t de:velopment on 
narrowly na.tio~l- bases:. I:f autarchical. principles . can have · even local 
success anywhere, it is not in the belt of small. states poor in resources 
and with limited markets. Government . sponao.r.ship of economic deyelpp-
ment presupposes. a large measure of international cooperation •••• ) 
1. Moore, 
2. Ibid. 
). Ibid., 
4o 
Emphasizing political. stability and internationaL cooperation, Moore 
sugges.ts- that economic development may. b.e.· fostered . by: (1) Some · govern-
mental . protection and . subsidisa.ti.on· of industry, but no.t. with an, ·autar·chical 
approach. (2) A stable monetary sy:stem .. and a fiscal policy that · does. not 
impede capital formation. (.~) Appropriatt .. consideration of industrial 
location, dealing. with such factors as .. resources, markets, power, trans-
portation, labor supply and capital. For example, light indus.tries : su.ch 
as. the. textile industry, which is very valuable from the - standpoint of 
industrialization, ar.e· amenable to considerable"; dispersion. ( 4) Wider 
educati.on and free. technical training with a view· to achieving a desirable 
distribution of akills among the labor force. (5) Increasing .. the . incentives 
and seeuri ty of' indus.trie.l employment so that the agricultural population 
will be induced to leave the 1-and.l 
Such a broad program:.:·.seema,. t .o be both realistic and feas-ible. The more 
specific requirements, such .. as increasing foreign trade, tax. reform, in-
creasing productivity and eecreas-ing unit costs. and prices, stim.ula ting 
investment (which at .present . aho.uld be. in the form of wage. eapi tal and raw 
materials), encouraging emigration, and increas-ing empl.oyment ei.t.her sup-
plement or fit in with it. 
Some of the requirements of such. a program are- already being, met, es-
pecially in the. field of internationaL economi.c coopera.tion.. Some.· of· the 
present experiences. show., however, that there are; many dif'ficul t choices 
to make with regard to Italian economi.c. recovery, even given basi.c agree-
ment on the ultimate end,which must be social and political stability with-
1. Moore, Economic Demography, pp. 1'9-140. 
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in a .democratic fr~ework. 
For example, to what extent will a policy: of monetary stabilization 1m-
pinge on the s t imulation of investment, and which of the.s.e.· policies should 
be emphasized in any case? The · Italian Government hae.i· so. far followed. a 
policy which has concentrated its efforts at fighting inflation.l '!his 
restrictive policy has been carried out in the orthodox, neo.-claasical 
manner, making use of credit restrictions, the interest rate.2 and mighty 
efforts to balance the budget by reduced Government spending rather -than by 
increased taxation~ while gsvernmental interference has been .kept at a 
minimum. '!he object has been, of course, to strengthen the lira and thus 
to prepare Italy for the day when· American dollars · will no longer flow into 
the country at the current rate and the lira must, largely unaided, procure 
Italy 1s needs from the world market on which she. is so dependent. 
There are many who believe that the Ital.ian Government's . restrictive 
policy is only prolonging the. unemployment problem without bringing about 
the necessary condi.tions for. Italian economic recovery. These · people ri 
see the great danger to .. so.cial. and political stability involved in the high 
rate of unemployment and theref ore advocate a "full employmentn policy such 
as England, Norway and the Netherlands, for example, are pursuing.. Such a 
policy, reduced to simple terms, involves a great deal of public expenditure 
(to create jobs) plus governmental. economic controls and eff~tive taxation 
1. The remainder of this chapter draws heavily upon Christensen's monograph, 
Italy 'a E.conomic Policy, which is a detaile-d examination of the 
issues discussed here. 
2. Of. Ninetta S. Jucker, 11Dollars and Drift in De · Gaspe.r.i 1e Italy, n 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 25, 1951, p. 10. 
). Christensen, Italy's Economic Policy, p. 2!). 
(to control inflation). 
The leading Italian ·economists, however., have never been particularly 
impressed. by the Keynesian theory of economic development .and have remained 
orthodox in their views. 'Ihey insist · that such a full . employment policy is 
not applicable to Italy as it is to Britain. Christensen suggests what is 
probably the chief reason for this, namely, the .ineffectiveness·· of' economic 
controls in Italy.l A full employment policy depend.s very much on the ab-
sence of "leakages" in the economy. Public and. private investment must be 
directed into channels indicated by the specific needs , of the country. Tax-
ation must be effective if inflation is to be kept 11 suppreased11 • (Another 
name · for the full employment policy is the "suppressed inflation" policy.) 
But as Chris tens en and other more recent reporter a on Italy suggest, I .,.,. •• .Lc..u~1 
have a naturaLantagonism toward economic controls in. any form . .; Americ~s, 
too, hate economic controls, but the Itali.ans go further by determinedly 
refusing to accept them. In the all-important field of taxation, which 
Italians look upon "as Americans once regarded prohibition,•2 Italians 
boastfully and successfully defy the government tax collectors. The Gov-
ernment even has hesi.tated to increase . the~ tax. rate for. fear tha.t total tax 
revenues would d.rop,- an unheard of propo.si tion in a"full employment" 
country. Christensen considers the Italian hate for economic controls "a 
national characteristic not to be overcome. in a short time"; and this. sug-
gestion is borne out by the rel.ati vely weak tax reforms. recently made la.ws. 4 
11:. Christensen, Italy's E.conomie Policy, p. ;1. 
2. Walter Weisbecker, •rtaliane· Hate Economic Controls," Lo.ok, XV, March 
1;, 1951, P• 126. 
;. Christensen, Italy's Economic Policy, p. ;1. 
4. Weisbecker, Look, XV, March 1;, 1951, p. 126. 
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It must be stressed that a full employment poli.cy such as England 1s is 
extremely unlikely to .work in Italy under these conditions. 
The Italian Government, howe.ver, s~nce it has complete control of some · 
Italian industries and partial control of others, does exert considerable 
influence on Italian industrial development whether it wants to or not. The 
State, for example, owns · the railwayst pos.ts and telegraphs, and some: auto-
transport services. It controls the · three principal telephone companies and 
the major steamship companies. 'lb.e Government also controls 2~ per centof 
the output of electricity, SOper cent of' the iron production, and around 
50 per cent of the steel output. It also owns about one-third of the 
mechanical industry, the tobacco monopoly, and sections. of other industries. 
The Italian Government also is carrying out large scale public works pro,. ... ,., .. 1 
Thua, as Christensen suggests, Italy does ··have a full employment policy to 
a certain extent. The issue · is, shall the Government · pursue such a policy 
more vigorously, or shall it rather oontinue · to concentrate its efforts 
toward stabilizing the economy and the lira? The former · policy . is designed 
to deal as qui.ckly as possible with unemployment and the problem of social 
instability. The latter policy is designed to bring Italy 1s economy to a 
condi.tion of stability, based on a stable -equilibrium of its balance of' pay-
ments, which can be maintaine.d without extraordinary outside help.. C.an 
economic .stability ever be achieved unless social stability is first in-
sured? Of what use is social s.tability today if' it is based on outside 
economic aid which ~Ul aoort be largely or completely withdrawn?. The answer, 
of course, 1e that a .· balance between these. two policies must be struck, 
1. Christensen, Italy's Economic Policy, P• 15. 
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keeping in mind that such a "balance.• will be meaningless, from ,the stand-
point of social justice and demo.cracy , _ unle.ss- the Government insures that 
economic stability is reached at a level of economic activity which will 
give Italians .. a more tolerable , standard · of living. 
What an uns.pec.tacular., what an .. entirely unimaginative answer this is; 
how commomplace, how unimepired. But in the face of .realitiee, imaginative 
panaceas- pall. 
From the facts and issues presented in this chapter U. is hoped that it 
is c.lea-r that Italy's econel!lY'-must progress. cautiously if it is to be a 
sound econom.v. Moreover; it seems. to be out of the question that Italy 
should try to become· an·, industriaL giant.. S.ome writer-s seem to think 
that this is not only possible but necessary. Baail D&vi.dson, for instance, 
disparages light ind1i.stries because they are -used, it seems, by capitalists 
only to garner quick profi ts.l It is difficult to see, however, how .a 
profit-hungry- entreprene.ur will _ be d.eterred from hie purpose ·merely because 
he runs a steel mill instead. of a toy factory. 
1. Basil Davidson, " ••• And Heaven Too II, n New-Statesman and. Nation, 
XXXVIII, Aug. 6, 1949, P• 142. 
OHAP'mR III 
'!HE SOCIO-POLITICAL MILIEU 
We have discussed at some length Italy 1s economi.c problems. At many 
points, notably, in( dea.ling with the North-South pattern, the system of 
land tenure, and unemployment,. the foregoing discussion tended strongly to 
gravitate from the economic to the social t.i:eld. Such a tendency is natural 
because that process haslong been taking place in the mind of every 
Italian. 
'!he thesis of this . chap.te.r ie. that the: economic problems. of ·Itfl,ly 
eventuate in a particular state. of mind. in the Italian people intimately 
related to those problems. Like a fiery branding .iron that sears a mark 
on a calf's hide., the Italian economy over the years has seared its pattern 
on the colle.ctive Italian mind. The. process. of searing. is, the -process of 
economic problems becoming social problems. From this poi~t Italian 
enter the realm of polities. 
The Psycho-Social Nexus 
There is very little di.stance from the economic problems to the social 
problema of Italy, and even less- distance from. the social problema. to the 
very psychology of the Italian people. Illiteracy, for example, which in 
19'1 could be attributed to 45 per cent of the peasants in the, .South, is 
closely connected to the economic and social s.y·stem of Italy. To the. loc!ll 
landlord peasant illiteracy is a. boon which he cultivates assiduously. It 
1. Levi, New York Times Magazine, Nov. 6, 1949, P• 14. 
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heightens the significance of his own literacy which has long. been, to the 
ignorant peasants, a mark of great distinction and. pres,tige. Li.teracy is 
the scepter of the local petty tyrant, it is the mark which identifies him 
as part of the ruling class- and_ tends to 1'-g:i.timize, in the- eyes of the 
peasant, the power he wields over them. Such power is of a moral nature and 
usually .needs no material force .for itsenf'orcement,- that .is, except in-
dirac tly. For the peasant 1s illiteracy i .e to a great degree' the result of 
his extreme poyerty and the landlord, knowing this, does all he can to ex-
ploit the- peasant economi.cally by charging, for example, high rent f or 
unproductive land.l 
Yet in a period of social unrest such as - Italy is_ undergoing . the pea13ant 
and the poor classes in general, in their spiritual perturbation, . struggle 
against the traditional .respect for the ruling class . which they have inheri 
ed from their fathers; strive to break. _the s.pir.i.tua1 honda that the pre-
scriptive privileges of the ruling. class have woven around their minds. 
To violate traditional ruling clase privileges is almost a sacrilege to 
most lower class Italians .and especially to the - southern-peasants but in 
their misery they tend to overcome their o:wn moral scruples. 
The landlords. and the neo-nobility . of indus.try perceive this struggle. 
But they, too, are, to a great extent, slaves to. the social system• they, 
too, have their minds - bound up by centuries old privileges that have ac-
quired for them, as well as -for the lower classes; a sort of' inviolable 
sanction. Therefore the ruling class, feeling ita -mora-l authority wi tp.er, 
and lacking the insight to overcome their own unreasoning prejudices and 
1 .. _, Levi, New York Times Magazine, Nov. 6, 1949, P• 14. 
pride, falls back upon the ultimate bastion of . that authority, its econ-
omic power.l 'lhus the -issue is . joined, in the last analysis, in the econ-
omic field where the intrenched ruling class must use -economic weapons to 
bolster up its waning moral authority. 
The ensuing struggle creates bitterness and hasa generally demoralizing 
effect on the whole nation. ElizabethWiekema.n notes, 
In a poor and in some ways backward country the inequality of wealth 
is mo.re flagrant and therefore become.e odious, the rich are greedier 
about their wealth because- they are more frightened of powerty, and this 
forces the rest of the inhabitants to feel more hostile towards · them 
and probably neceesi tates state. interference. In other words, poverty 
and social inequality in Italy not only. stimulate bribery, theft and 
corruption, but induce landslides to the lef't.2 
Geoffrey Godwin, reporting from .. Rome in 1948 noted the abysmal contrast 
between the very poor and the very rich and wrote, 
Between these -extremes of powerty and plenty the unfortunate middle 
clas ses live in worry, misery and hunger. Tied to desk or counter, 
straining inadequate salarie.s to maintain the standard of lif'e ··they know, 
they are fast becoming desperate. Between- the extremes, they feel the 
precariousness· of their very existence; and they too Li"ike - the very pooiJ 
are ready to listen to the glib who promise all.~ 
In Italy the economic problems· .insinuate. themselves, in their effect, 
into the frame of mind of the Italians and they eventuate in the field of 
politics. '.Ihis is a crucial process. The significant point that it brings 
out is that the content of' politics in Italy is overwhelmingly economic and 
aoel-al in nature. But even more important and signif icant is the indication 
supported by the statements above that, from" the standpoint of human motiv-
ation, the content of Italian politics is psychological and not ideological. 
In other words, the Italian is motivated politically by pressures that he 
1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, p. 21. 
2. Wiskemann, Italy, P• 148. 
~· Geoffrey Godwin, "Rome Bewildered," Spectator, CLXXX, . Feb.~O, 1948, 
p. 220. 
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feels; both ph!lsically and. spiritually, not by doctrines tha.t seem. to have 
vague connotations for. his concrete experien.ce.. These·, it is · maintained, 
are long-established facts in Italy and we shall .. return to them and deal 
with them more thoroughly, but first we must look at the nature and posi-
tions of the Italian political parties. 
PoliticaL Parties 
Since April, 1948, the · Government . has .. be.en . eon.trolled: by a eoali tion led 
by the . Ohriatian-Democratic Party under Alcide de. Gaeperi. 'the opposition 
has been, led by the .Oommunist Party supported ina Popular Front by t he 
Left Socialist Party. 
At the end of .the . war six parties emerged from- the · confusion of Italian 
politics· to take·. up the task ot governing Italy. These: parties had. been 
underground during the Fascist r .e-gime:. and. had, since- 194;>, b.een cooperating 
through Committeee . of National Li.be.re..t .ion .in the · Resistenza . age.ins.t the 
Fascists and the. neo-Fas.cists. 'lhese political .parties function.ed as a 
provisional government :which paved the way for the · first free - elections. in 
Italy since· .. Mussolini had acf!uired power-. Simul tane.oualy. with. the . elec-tions 
of June 2, 1946 there was held the ref erendum which overthrew the -I tal ian 
Monarchy. 
The; parties that f'o.rme.d .. the · Government up to the time. of' the election of 
June - 2 .. may ·; be classif'i.ed, .wi.th; respect to their political leanings, as 
f'ollows:l Le:f't: Socialis .. t Party, Communist Party, Acti.on Party. Rights 
Ohristian-Demo.cr.atic. Party, Liberal . Party, Demo.er.atic,..Labor Party. 
The main, or "mass" parties -are the Christian-Democratic, the Socialist, 
1. Of. W. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left, p. 
and the . Communist partie .. s. These are well<!"kn.own .and shalL be dealt with 
eeparately in subsequent sections. The :Action Party was. one. of the first 
and strongest resistors ~- of· Fascism, rabidly re.publice.n and .radically re-
formist in 1 ts views • It was .. a . party of new ideaa, .but i .t lost its support 
and vitality: as the major parties took over those, ideas-.1 The Lib.eral . 
Party is the bas.tion, like: liberalparties . in all . parliamentary countries, 
of individual liberty, lawand order, and amodif'ied system of free enter-
' prise. Although it cam.e · out of the warwith rather progressive ideas, it 
has since then become · incteaeingly- more .. rightist and conservative. Even 
in 1946 the Liberal .. Party already W·aB the most cons.er..vative of the coali-
tion of six.2 The. Democr.ati.c-Labor Party espoused syndicalism: and . Free-
masonry in an- attempt. to counterbalance the Catholic . Ohris.tian-Democratic 
Party. It ha1Lvery little .sup.port and. lost even this when· it joined the 
pro-monarchiest Liberals- in the elections of June2.; 
Two other parties not in the- Government before June; 1946 were the 
Republican Party and the,. Mon.e.r.chi.st Party. The former was de:f'ini tely anti-
Communist, espoused Mazziniair principles, and hadc .. views. in general akin to 
those of the Action Party. As, the Action Party disintegrated later on, 
man,y of its memberswent .over to the· Republicans.4 
The general elections of June 2, 1946 were held for the purposeof elect-
ing a Oonsti tuent Assembly which was to create the new. Italian · constituti.on-
al . sta.te. The results indicate ,. the:. p.opular and parliamentary: s. trength of 
the parties (see Table 8, following. page). The· new- Government . that was-
formed was a coalition of the three mass p~r.tiee and the Republican Pa.rty. 
1. Grindrod, '!he New Italy, P• ;8. 
2. Ibid., PP• ;7=41. 
;. Ibicl., P• 41. 
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TABLE 8 
RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS, JUNE 2, 124¢'* 
Party 
Christian Democrat 
Socialist • • • 
Communist • • • 
• 
• 
National Democratic Union 
(Liberal & Labor Democratic) 
Republican· • . • • • 
Action • • • • • 
Other • • • • • 
Total • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Popular Votes 
• 8,08,?,208 • 
• 4, 744,749 • 
• 4,)42,722 • • 
• 1,559,417 • 
• 997,690 • • 
• 
,,,, 758 
• • 
• 2 1 821 2 ~46 • • 
• 22,952,890 
Seats 
• 207 
• 115 
lo4 
• 41 
• • 2~ 
• • 7 
• • ~ 
* Source: Grindrod, The · New Italy, p. 47. Of the "other* parties, 
the Uomo Q).lalunque Party got 1,209,918 votes and )0 seats. 
'Ihe coalition proved to be an· unstable one, · as · coalitions tend to be, 
and by late 1947 the division between Communists · and Chris.tian-.Democrats 
had become .unbridgeable. In April 1948, therefore, another general election 
was held and as a result of it the Christian Democratic Party was able to 
form a more stable coalition Government excluding the Communists and the 
bulk of the Socialist Party which. now wa&· called the Left Socialist Party. 
'!he Communist Party 
The Communist Party emerged fr,om the war with a party line that was the 
extreme oppoei te of ita pre-Fascist policy, nam.ely, to pe.rticipa.te in the 
Government regardless of what · party or individual . formed it, not even bar-
ring the discredited King. Their primary concern was . to get a place in the 
Government, to exert some control in running the oountry.l 
Such a . policy. would have been repulsive to the Party in the days before 
Museolini, when every and all governmentawere •to be opposed, regardless of 
their composition or aims, unless it were exclusively eocialist. The re~son 
for the new party line, however, becameapparent as Communist elements in 
1. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left, p. 168. 
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the coalition governments - of the Ea-stern European countries staged a suc-
cession of coups, the most alarming of .which (from our point of view) placed 
Czechoslovakia in the list of Soviet satellites. 
Clearly the Italian Communist Party had intended to deliver Italy over 
to the Soviet Union. Having fail~.d to .do this, a failure which was punc-
tua ted by their failure to remain. in -the . Government and their electoral 
defeat in April, 1948, the Communist Leaders · have concentrated 6n turning 
their party organization. into a . machine. which threatens to destroy the !tal-
ian Government whenever it is. off guard. 
'!he leaders of the Communis.t Party have · recently announced in public that 
they will oppose "'with all our atre.ngth •• Italy's participa-tion in a war 
against the Soviet Union.l Only a sophistic argument can deey· that such a 
statement is traitorous, on the f.a.ce of it. Only a legal twist. prevents it 
from being a violation of the Italian Constitution, Article 52 of which 
declares, "Defense of the fatherland is a aaerediuty of the citizen." 
The Communist Party is cleaJ.·ly a threat to the national existence of 
Italy. Moreover, the continued existence of the Communist Party in its 
present strength makes Italy a dangerous and volatile and uncertain quantity 
in the framework of international power politics and a factor of inter-
national instability. 
The Italian Communist Party is a fair facsimile of the. Marxi.at-Leniniat 
model. Ideally i .ts proletarian backing should be greater than. the )0 per 
cent of the electoral vote. that it haa been able to control in Italy and 
its membership, i.e., the 0vanguard of the proletariat," should be less 
1. Edmund Stevens, 0 Italian Communism: Its Methods and Masters I, ° Chris 
Science Monitor, Nov. 21, 1950, P• 7• 
52 
than the two million persons which currently make the Italian Communist 
Party second only to that of the Soviet. Uni.on (possibly China-'s may be 
larger) • 1 The. Communist Party makes up for this de:f'iciency,ho:wever, by 
following the · ref inement of organization instituted by Lenin, nam&ly, by 
building itself around a "hard core 11 about one-tenth the size of the Com-
munist Party as a whole.2 
1he official. leader of the Communist Party. both in the Chamber of Deputie 
and within the party in general is Palmiro Togliatti, who, from the days of 
Fascist power to the end of World War II stayed in Russia and was a member 
of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist P~rty. But he has become 
more the patro.n of the party than its leader. '!be · Communist Party machinery · 
is controlled by Pietro Secchia, wh,o. has been described as- "a great orl!"t1.!~•~en~'" 
even if devoid of intelligence."' Secchia controls the hard core of the 
party and is its link with international Oommunism.4 He also controls, 
through his lieutenant, Luigi Longo, a· widespread,,. "Military Apparatus" of 
clandestine ful!.-time soldiers totalling a force of about 15(),000 men and 
officers strategically placed throughout Italy and having a cached store of 
ten days 1 supply of emmuni tion and arms ( whi.ch include field. pieces-). This 
force reportedly can be called to arms on short notice.5 Thus, 
the Togliatti-Se.cchia · juxtapositions run. parallel throughout the. party 
structure. At every level there is a double authority- one political, 
the other formal. Behind every party: functionary there is someone · who 
1. Stevena, OhristianScienee Monitor, Nov. 21, 1950, p. 1. 
2. Edmund Stewena., "Italian Communism: Its Methods and Masters II," 
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 22, 1950, p. 15. 
;. Vittorio Ivella-, "Party Rule. in . the Democratic State, 11 Foreign Affaire, 
XXVIII, Oct., 1949, P• 81. 
4. Stevens, OhristianSeienee Monitor, Nov. 22, 1950, p. 15. 
5· Ibid. Of. also) !vella, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, p. 81. 
holds no official position but who wields the real power. He is one of 
Signor Secchia 1s men.l 
There is no way of aaeertaining to what extent the · strength of the Com-
munist Party today is baaed on ideology, that is to say, unquestioning 
loyalty. Certainly its ideological basis does -not extend far beyond the 
limits of the "hard core" and the 11Mili tary Apparatua•. The rest of the 
membership can probably accurately be characterized as, a section of the 
floating vote being held captive-. The~e- ar..e two broad reasons for this 
captivity, one is a -historical accident, the other, economic misery. 
The Communist Party at the end of the war was allowed by the· Allies to 
take over all &.S:Sets - and properties of the Fascist labor· confederation in 
its · guise as the Confederazione - Generale Italiana di La.voro, the Italian 
General Confederation of Labor. (OGIL). The assets included the peneion 
funds of hundreds of thousands of workers wh.o now find. it convenient to 
join the Communists and stay in the CGIL for the sake of financial security. 
If they leave the CGIL to join some non-Communist union they lose their 
pension rights.2 
The Communist Party draw.s . heavily for . its membership . ~ the indus.trial 
districts of the North where there,, is a high rate -of industrial unemployment 
It draws, too, not only upon the- common laborers but also upon technicians, 
college . graduates and other professional people just entering the labor 
force . and faced with an almost totaL absence of professional .opportuni.ties. 
The Communist Party is also, for many, a symbol of protest against the 
social injustices of the country, for often, it is the only party that 
speaks for bold social reforms.; And as was pointed out at the beginning 
1. Stevens, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 22, 1950, P• 15. 
2. Stevena, Christian Science· Monitor, Nov. 21, 1950, P• 1. 
.l . • 
of this chapter, the Communist Party also haa a certain attra.ction for the 
impoverished middle. classes ... which, in desperation, are turning to whom ever 
promi.ses them. a happier lot. 
The Italian- Communi.s .t Party, in short, is .the .expre.aaion. of the despair 
born of long suffering from extreme poverty, of the: Italianpe.o:ple. To 
this extent it is the cancerous offspring of Italian social problem,s. 
Certainly Communist ideas; with their athe-ist content. and their denial. of 
humanist individualism are alien to Italian cul tur.e . and thought. Marxist 
doctrines were long ago. discredi te.d,- and not by mere Vatican propagandists. 
The conscientious tackling. of Marxi.sm.. at a high logical level by 
s.ome Italian profes-sor a at this time £the 1890 1 s, Croce was their leadeiJ 
was important in the· light of later events, for it put "philosophical" 
Marxism once and for all out of the -· rwming as e. creed for clear-think-
ing Italians • 
• • • Marxism as a · philoso.phic and historical doctrine effe.ctively vani.shed 
from Italy about 1900; what r.emained was political Marxism, that is, a 
refusal to cooperate with the capitalist state •pending the inevitable 
revolution and the dictatorship of the prole.tarh.t.l 
As we- have seen, the . strategy of non-cooperation was:·- changed · after 
World War II to one of subversion:. :from within .the : government. Having failed 
in this the ,Communists have had to revert to a . dyna.mi.c .refinement of non-
cooperation, namely, di.sruption of the country 'a economi.c .. and. moral fiber 
on a large . scale. For only by agg.ravating Italy's social -problems can the 
Party pe.rpe.tua.te 1 ts raison d 'etr.e. Yet these problems, it has. been aug-
geated, are to a great extent either· solveable or aus.ceptible· to a. great 
deal of amelioration. Thl,.s is the basic weakness, it is suggested, of the 
Italian Communist Party. 
1. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left, p. 2;. 
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The -Chris-tian-Democratic: Party 
The Christia.n-Democra tic Party had 1 ts birth. shortly. after World War I. 
Up to that time the Catholic Church, stilL smarting from · the .injustices it 
felt it had suffered at the time of Italy 1 s . unifi.ca.tion, had refused to 
sanction the participation of Catholiea,. in. the Italian. Government. Those 
Italians who did take .part in the governing of Italy were looked upon, 
ostensibly at leas-t, as< a sort. of .renegades. · In the face of the . growing 
socialist strength after 19()0, however, the Church recognize.d . ita. policy as 
a self'!"'defea.ting one ·, and. therefore sancti.oned the pe.rti.cipa.tion of Catholics 
in the · Chria.tian-Demo.eratic movement . which had. been. started by an e~ter-
pris.ing Sicilian priest, Don Luigi . Sturzo. Xt its birth, 
Christian Democracy had a. .pariia.mentary character and hence. waa . a , liberal 
movement, but 1 t was hostile to bourgeois anti-Catholic liber.alism. The 
reeul t was that it developed into a· broadly-based democratic party. '!hie 
was the source of its strength.! 
Its broad base- has-also. become:. the ·SDuroe of its weakness. For the post-
war economic disruption of · the country has - resulted in a polarization of 
politicaL affiliation in. Italy. The Christian-Democratic Party is as . much 
the victim of this. polarization as .. the Communist . Party has. been the bene-
ficiary. of it. Today the Chriatian'!"'Democra tic.. Pa.r.ty is really a. coalition 
of anti:-Co.mmunists .. arrayed in the. usual political spectrum from extreme 
rightists to extreme liberals.2 
Into the ranks. o.f Christian-Democracy have been driven moat of the -more 
conservative elements in Italy. But this..·. should. not be · aurpri.sing• There 
undoubtedly is much truth in Basil Davideon 1a statement that the southern 
1. !vella, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, P• 77· 
2. Ibid. 
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landowners have become a "central pillar of the Demo-Christian temple" and 
that De Gaspari, the Christian-Democratic leader, is closely connected 
with 11 t he industrialists, landowners and cardinals. al But while sueh a 
statement gives a fairly good description of the Chr.istian-Democratic Party, 
if taken objectively, it nevertheless sheds more heat than . light on the , ~ ) 
subject because it is too much like an epithet. While it is easy enough 
righteously to accuse these conservatives who represent vested interests in 
the country of being too slow in needed reforms, it would bebetter tore-
fleet not only on the natural human reluctance to part, even at a price, wi 
one 'a inheritance or to risk losing a profitable investment, but also on 
the desire of those who are asked to do these things to be reassured that 
their action will bear the desired fruit. It is not entirely unreasonable 
to suppose that a deep sense of responsibi1ity may motivate caution in soci 
ref orms, caution that is easily: mistaken for timidity or even a perverse 
sort of conservatism. This .. is no.t to say, however, that Italy does not 
have more than its share of stubborn and extremely selfish conservatives • 
.It would be naive to excuse obstruction of national recovery merely on 
the grounds that human beings tend to be selfish. And there can be no 
doubt that Christian-Democratic conservatism has been obstinately, and all 
too successfully, obstructive in the matter of social re:f'ol"ms.2 In addition 
to such obstruction, these conservatives- have m~ged to. ge.t their sons 
into the- already redundant and inefficient Italian admi.nistrative bureau-
cracy-where · they can sabotage the reforms that are legislated.~ 
The job of coping wLth this situation has fallen to Alcide De Gasper!, 
l. Basil Davidson, "••• And Heaven Too I,• New Statesman and Nation, 
XXXVIII, July ~0, 1949, P• 116. 
2. Smith, State of Europe, p. 220. ~. Ibid., P• 214. 
a leader of Christian-Democracy who spent the years of' the Faeeist regime, 
after he could no longer safely: oppose it, in the sanctuary of' the Vatican. 
De Gaspari's shief goal has been to steer clear of the extremes- within his 
party and yet maintain it as a unified coalition of' interests based on 
mutual accOJiodation.l At this sort of thing he must surely be a - peerless 
expert by now for after reconciLing the . minorities wi.thin his own party he 
must further, as Prime Minister of Italy, reconcile the policies o:f his 
party with those of the coalition Government over which he presides and 
which includes the Re.publicans and . the Right Socialists. 
·Although the Chri.sti.an-.Demo.eratic Party i.s ine.vitab.ly sensitive to Chur.ch 
interests it is not, it is claimed, subserv-i.ent to them• Expressly Catholic 
interests are promoted chie.f'ly by the -Catholic Action movement le.d by 
Profess.or Gedda. The obvious analogy between· Gedda-1s group as • the hard core 
within the Chris.tian-Demoeratic . Party and Secchia 's group as. the hard core 
within the Communis.t Part is not accurate. Gedda is an antagonist of De 
Gaspari and the latter takes pains to reduce , the . influence of Catholic 
in his party or the taking over of' the . party machinery by that group.2 
is· uncertain whether Catholic Action is an asset or a . liability to Chris 
Democracy. 
It is a debatable. question, too, whether demo.cr.acy: . or Catholi.eiem. .is. the 
basic ideology of' Christien~Democracy. In the last anaJ.yeis-, - since De 
Gaspari 1s party must a.ccomodate a wide variety of individuals, a . mixture o:f 
both will obtain. Hilton-Young maintains, 
1. Cf. !vella, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, P• 11· 
2. Ibid., P• 78. 
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Order, democratic methods, freedom of opinion and of the press, to a 
certain extent the privilege of the propertied clas.a, all these are· be-
hind Zfie Gasperi 'il .stand against the communists; but principally it 
is as. a Roman Catholic that he g.overns I .taly. • • • Signor de Gas.peri is 
the expression of that which Italy has in parti.cular to eppose to com-
munism, and it is no.t as in some other countries democracy, but 
catholicism.l 
Catholicism is .a source of strength for the Christian•Democratic. Party. 
It marks that party, for example, as one indigenous.· to Italy and Italian 
eul ture. Even its heterogeneous me:r;nbership and. its consequent inability 
to act consistently or qud.ekly is, as · we shall see., a .mark of its Italian 
origins, as well, of course~ as an indication of its wi.de support. The 
Christian-Democratic Party has an ideological appeal. to Italians, backed 
by its completely Italian charac.ter, which is unmatched by aey other party, 
leas,t of all the Communis.t Party. 
But ideology is merely an auxiliary. basis of streng.th for an Italian 
party under. the present conditions.. It is a fund of good will which can 
quickly evaporate, if it fails adequartely to relieve the burdens . of Italy 1s 
poverty. To the extent that its divers.e elements prevent the Christian-
Democratic Party from rising to the challenges that face it, therefore, 
that party has a grievous. weakness. 
The Socialist Party 
The Socialists in Italy today are displaying the same disunity, indeci-
sion and vagueness .. of purpose · that have long b.een their trademark.2 The 
Social.i.st .Par.ty, with the bulk of its ... support in the North., somehow, at the 
end of the war lost control of the most important bloc of Italian labor, the 
1. Hilton-Young, The Itali.an Left, p. 185. 
2. Hilton-Young's The Ital~an Left contains an excellent study of the 
history of the Italian Socialist Party in Italian politics. 
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CGIL, to the Communists with whom. it had been associated. In 1947, however, 
the issue of the continued un1 ty of the. Soci.aliste. and the Communists splin-
tered the former. The bulk of the party, led by Pietro Nenni., insisted on 
maintaining a "Popular Front" with the Communists in the interests of 
working class unity. '!he. right-wing. Soci.ali.sts under Giuseppe Saraga t, 
however, resented Communi at .domination. and chose to disassa.ciate. from both 
parties and join the Christian-Democrats in a coalition government. Iron-
ically, therefore, while the-extreme left, the Communists, had been the 
most desirous of taking part in the governing of ltaly, it was the extreme 
right, in the end, which achieve that goal. 
Signor Saragat gives an enl.ightening account of his reasons. for breaking 
off from the· main body of the party. The real di vi.sion in Italy, he main-
tains, is not among the Socialists, Christian-Democrats, Liberals, Republi 
and other democratic parties but rather between .the .democratic pe.rties .. and 
the authoritarian parties. What Italy needs is not parliamentary tactics 
but cooperation to improve conditions. Mere exploitation of poverty and 
bad conditione for political reasons, such. as. the -Communists engage in, 
will not improve those conditions. Hence Sar.agat and his Socialist fol-
lowers joined the Government coalition. in 15(48. And while cooperating with 
the Christian-Democrats, he nevertheless continues to press for the Sooiali 
point of view and Socialist prin·ciples. Signor Saragat concludes, "The 
real problem faced by the" Italian democracy today, let me repeat, is of' an 
economic and social ne.ture.nl 
1. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, P• 620. 
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The Psycho-Social Nexus (Concluded) 
Signor Saragat 1s statement a,.ove is a fitting conclusion to our dis-
cussion of Italian political parties. For the real . problems in. Italy are, 
indeed, economic and eoeia.l in natur.e, a.nd. a: look at Italian political 
parties has confirmed this view. For what, after all, is there in I~l1an 
politics but a Communist Party, living. on economi-c mis.ery and. aggrav:a.ting 
that misery in the hope of prolonging . its own ex.i.etence; a Christ ian-Demo-
cratic Party composed of moderates , and proper.ty owners who are engaged in 
the dangerous game of exchanging grudging amounts of economi.c and social 
reforms in return for equally grudging amounts of social .and political 
stability; and a Socialist Party split asunder, the minerity convinced 
that the economic facts· do not permit indulgence in the luxury of ideolog-
ical speculation, the majority following aimlessly. the siren call of ideo-
logy, being led the while by another par~ whose strength is hardly based 
on ideology% 
The real problems in Italy are economic and social in nature and polities 
are the plaything of economic and social condi tiona as. they ramify. into 
the minds of the Italians. Italy has never had a very active political 
life in the American sense-. Its parliaments, almost since the birth of 
the nation, have been characterized by tras.formismo, which is a particularly 
virulent strain of the vaunted Anglo-Saxon ability and tendency to compro-
mise. Under this system the Government i .s · formed of ministers chos en on 
the basis . of their influence and power in certain constituencies., and the 
individual deputies' vote depends not on a party line, primarily, but on 
what the Government has promised to do for him or his constituency. This 
tactic was perfected by Giolitti in the years just preceding the turn of 
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the century. Hilton-Young quotes.: C.J .s. Sprigge, 
Luigi Sturzo ••• said that "in the. entire course of the half century 
of Italian parliamentary government after 1870, two effective parlia-
mentary partj,es confronted each other for the first. and only time at the 
turn of the century, when Zanardelli took the place of Pelloux." This 
is the key to the whole history of parliamentary rule in Italy. lt 
was only then that the party struggle without which democracy ia bound 
to misfire emerged., and for a year · or two only. Before that time was 
trasformismo and after it was trasformismo •••• l 
As late as 1947 Elizabeth Wiekemann reported that the poverty in the 
South still made possible the 0 ma.de·" majorities of the Giolitti era.2 The 
present coalition Government acts in the spirit of trasformiamo, the Com-
muniats and Left Socialists being prevented from joining in that at present 
only because the Government has no need of their support. But the point I.e 
is that it would be nothing new to an Italian to change his political 0 con-
victions" for economic reasons. 
If traaformismo shows- the unimp.ortance of political creeds in Italy, 
events among the organized workers of Italy emphasize that unimportance and 
give us an insight into the psychological processes of the workers• minds. 
During 1948 the Communist dominated CGIL was splintered as Christian-Demo-
cratic, Republican and right-wing Socialist elements in that confederation 
separated from the main body and formed separate unions. But the bulk of 
the organization remained unified. 
In spite of the sharp differences in political . opinion held by the 
minority groups remaining within the CGIL, there is apparently a strong 
sentiment among them in favor of trade-union unity within the OGIL. 
Trade-union conferenc.ee of the United-Socialists, the Fusionist-Socialist 
and the Republican parties, held in the fall of 1948, all officially 
endorsed the action taken by their leaders in retMining with the CGIL.3 
1. Hilton-Young, The Italian Left, P• ' 52. 
2. Elizabeth Wiskemann, "South Italian. Problem,n Spectator, CLIXVII, Aug. 
16, 1946, P• 163. 
3. nPoatwar Labor Movement in Italy, 0 Monthly Labor Review, LXVIII, Jan., 
1949, P• 52 • 
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But if this incident indicates the minor importance of political labels 
in Italy, does it not indicate the existence of social clasees in Italy? 
Indeed, does not the eventuation of economi,c problems into social problems 
as described at the beginning of this chapter also indicate a- system of 
social classes? The answer, it is sugges-ted, ia that there: are social 
classes in Italy but that they are neither sufficiently class, conscious nor 
sufficiently cohesive to be of particular signif'icance· as: euch. 
The industrial working class which .ordinarily mi.ght be expected to be 
the moat cohesive and clear cut, nevertheless is not tully organize.d poli t-
ically. The part of that class that is politically. organized has been 
separating into antagonistic groups. The Communists, who are considered 
put masters at instilling class consciousness have failed in respect to 
the union which they control, the CGIL, so that at least two sections of' 
that union have separated from it and, during 1949, formed two new unions, 
the Free Ita~ian Confederation of' Labor (LCGIL) and. the. Italian Federation 
of' Labor (FIL) claiming a combined membership of over one and. one-P.alf 
million. From the standpoint of political action, it seems., the Italian 
industrial working class is .less socially cohesive than the British and 
almost on a par with the American. 
In agriculture we find a potentially dangerous .(from the point of view 
of social stability) social class in the day workers (braccianti) which 
includes 27 per cent of the agricultural labor force (see Table 2, P• 9)• 
These peasants , frequently form groupe and invade unworked es-tates; of'ten 
fighting off' the local constabulary the while, and begin to cultivate- the 
land. From them the Communists - draw their rural backing. Einsndi maintains 
however, that the Italian peasants are essentially individualiat and selfish 
and have shown an incapacity to accept the discipline even of cooperative 
undertakings designed to alleviate their misery.! 
In short, the social classes in Italy seem· to have little. more · signifi-
canoe, from the standpoint of political action .or any type of large scale 
concerted action, than social classes in the. United States. They are not 
social classes in the Marxist sense, with a deep sense ·of class conscious-
ness and a deep feeling of class solidarity:. 'lhe Calabrese peasant may 
harbor the same feelings towar.d his landlord, or toward the Calabrese · lati-
:fondisti. as the Apulian peasant toward his landlord or toward the Apuiie.n 
latifondisti.. But each is concerned only with .his own particular set~: of : · _.,_ 
grievances and each is interested only in bettering his own particular con-
di tion as his own opportunities arise and as he sees fit. 
Without minimizing the · fact of a high degree of social instability in 
Italy, therefore, we may neverthe1.ess largely discount Aylmer Vallance 1s 
assertion that Italy today is divided, as far as its social structure is 
concerned, into two nations, and. that there is an impending class struggle 
2 in the air. 
The Political Nexus 
The economic problems- of Italy have penetrated through the medium of the 
social problems it has created into the sphe.re of political. action. At 
this level therehas- arisen a. dangerous polarization of Italian society 
which further aggravates the· existing social instability: of the country. 
The Communist ,Party, confident in its irresponsibility, promisee -everything 
to the poverty stricken majority of the people under e. general program of 
1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, PP• 1;, 21. 
2. Vallance, New Statesman and Nation, Oct. 21, 1950, P• 269. 
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social reform. The Christian-Democ.rats, at once powerful because of their 
control 2of' the Government and. ye:t weak beca.uee of their heterogene.ity and 
their conflicting interests are, as a party attempting needed social re-
forms, in a position roughly comparable to that of a patient performing 
a. major operation on his own body, 
The Christian-Democrats, according to Davidson, are reluctant to go 
forward with reforms - because in eo doing they would be giving in to the 
Left. For example, he p!Dints out, to give greater autonomy to city govern-
ment and thus prune the cumbe-rsome centralized pref'ectur.al administrative 
machine.ry (this is part of the Christian~Democratic platform) would be, 
especially in the North, tantamount to turning many cities, including Turin, 
Venice, Genoa, Florence, Bologna,. and others to left-wing control. David-
son claims also that more democratic control of heavy industry (meaning, 
probably, a bigger voice for the trade unions) also meane giving more 
power to the left-wingers, and that land reforms will hurt:.the sourthern 
supporters of the Christian Democratic Party. He suggests, therefore, 
that the Christian-Democrats are speared on the berne of' a dilemma. They 
cannot go forward with reforms and can only, and have in fact gone, back-
ward toward fascism.l 
The facts shown at the beginning of this chapter, as well as events 
subsequent to Davidson's writing, .show that his impressions and predictions 
were somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless one canno.t overlook the fact that 
the United States, in applying its foreign policy toward Italy will be 
identified with the conservative elements of the country and to that extent 
1. Davidson, "••• And Heaven Too I," New Statesman and Nation, July ~0, 
1949, P• 116 • 
=========~II=============================================================~========== 
66 
--- -
- = =-=---=- -=--=-=-=---=--==~-=====-======ll~===-= 
stands to lose the sympathy and cooperation of a great section of the 
Italian public. 
It is suggested, however, that Ame:riean ·policy in Italy, while heavily 
colored by political aims, nevertheless works, through .ec.onomie means ·. In 
this way it has the opportunity, by attacking the underlying economic in-
justices in the social structure of Italy, to change this structure and 
also its political superstructure1 even~ against the -will of uia.ey. Italians. 
For this is the pecul.iar characteristic of' economic action, i .t can worl: al-
most unhampered in the non-partisan realm of' human ac.tivity but all the 
while. have great effect upon the p.oli tical superstructure. 'Ihis is partic-
ularly true in Italy where most of' the people have · only a casual allegiance 
to political groups and social classes. No Italian peasant will refuse a 
new plow, or h~brid corn seeds, on the grounds that they are · eupplied by a 
conservative Government. No Communist workman will refuse to work at a 
lathe because of its nationality. Yet employment and more food will in-
evitably relieve social discontent. The Communist workman may not become 
a Christian-Democrat. This is all the· better from the standpoint of. social 
stability, for a Communist Party full of relatively satisfied members will 
no longe r be a disruptive force in Italy. 
In this and the .. preceding chap.tera we have tried to establish. the facts 
with which an American foreign policy towar.d Italy must de.al if it i.a to 
help Italy achieve a stability conducive- to democratic government internally 
and toward international peace and security.. We have seen that. Italy is an 
economically poor country with an under-productive agriculture; an over-
abundant population, a serious deficiency of mineral >vealth and a helpless 
dependency on international trade. We have seen that these conditions, 
' 
aggravated by the war, have greatly increased the poverty and suffering of 
the Italian people. We have seen that the social and. politicaL mi.lieux .. in 
It.a.ly are closely related to economic condi.tions and .that therefore · the 
deterioration of the. latter has brought about a deterioration of' the former. 
We have also, however·, sugges-ted the avenues through which the· United 
States can approach and deal .with Italy's economic· problems . so that that 
country can achieve - stability and democracy. Such avenues include, for 
example, helping to increase the volume of international trade and helping 
Italy to increase its production and to get rid of some of its population. 
Hereinafter we will f ollow the course of postwar Am.e.rican f'oreign policy in 
Italy and try to evaluate its succeese-e or failures in terms of what 1 t has 
been designed to do and how far it has accomplished its ends. 
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PART II 
AMERICAN. ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY IN ITALY 
CHAPTER IV 
A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN POS111AR ECONOIHC 
POLICIES IN I TALY 
.American economic policy in Italy began, we might say , with the first 
American soldier who landed in Sicily and gave the first candy bar to 
the first pretty gi rl on the scene. No doubt he asked, and received, 
something in return. This same patt ern of intimate relationship, half-
spontaneous, half-forced, has inevitably been carried over to the rela-
tionship of the two countries ever since. It still shows up in some of 
the attitudes found in Italy. American economic aid to Italy has gone 
through two phases and is now in its thi rd phase. The first phase was 
the two-year period of UNRRA aid, the second \'tas a period of stop-gap 
emergency measures, the third is a period of concerted, planned a ction 
with long-term objectives. 
UNRRA Aid 
UNRRA began operations in Italy i n Mar ch 1945 when the Italian 
GovenL~ent signed a contract for $50 mi llion worth of aid and received 
the UNRRA Italian mis sion headed by an American,S.M. Keeny . The total 
aid to Italy during the two years of UNRRA operations far exceeded this 
sum. 
UNRRA1 s aims were chiefly concerned with relief and only secondarily 
with economic rehabilitation. 
UNRRA 1 e activities were limited strictly to the sending of relief 
supplies-such as food, fertilizer, transportation equipment, madicine 
and coal-that were needed to fight hunger, disease, and bad ,.,.eather. 
The UNRRA ~rogram was in no sense a program for basic economic 
recovery. 
It is suggested, however, t..11at even such emergency measures laid do'm 
the lowest stratum of the foundations of recovery. UNRRA probably was 
quite aware that this 'l'ras essentially part of its job and took measures to 
further it. Thus while feeding the hungry with i mported food it also set 
about a program of increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector 
of the economy. Its program of importing ral'l materials was calculated to 
start the \·rheels of Italian industry moving again. The compilation of 
statistical data on the Italian economy by the UNRRA Italian }~ission ,.rae 
in itself a. necessary and a long step in the direction of basic Italian 
. 2 
recovery. ··· 
It may seem odd that UNRRA should be included as part of American 
economic policy in Italy. Officially and formally, of course, this is 
not the case. But the United States contributed 73 per cent of all aid 
3 
sispensed by UI~RRA. The fact that one of the objectives of UNRRA was the 
4 
fostering of the principle of democratic freedom ' which is a main theme 
common to later phases of American economic policy in Italy also supports 
the inclusion of UNRRA aid as part of the post-'\'Iar American economic 
foreign policy. 
1. 
• 
Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., "The European Recovery Pro gr am, Phase Two," 
Current Readings in International Relations, ed. Norman J. 
Padedlford, Numbe r 5, 1949, P• 72. 
See the UiifRRA Survey_ already cited, 1-rhich sets forth a full account of 
UNRRA opera.tions in Italy up to early 1946, as 'I'Tell as a treasure 
house of Italian economic statistics. 
Fasts on File Yearbook, VII, New York, Faets on File Inc., 1547, p.27 
Of. Blaisdell, 11 Current Readi:ngs in International Relations," 
Number 5, 1949, P• 72. 
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UNRRA aid was terminated in Italy in February 1947. 
Emergency Aid 
Though UNRRA kept the Italian people alive it did not make them suf'fi-
ciently self-sustaining in food production to make further substantial re-
lief unnecessary. The. social and political instability that prevailed in 
Italy since the end of the -war continued unabaited.. Social and political 
instability was, indeed, prevalent throughout the whole of Europe-. But 
Italy, France and Austria were the foci of particularly grave social unrest 
based larsely-on hunger. Therefore in May 1947 Congress insti tute_d the 
Foreign Relief Program (Public Law 84, 80th Congress). By December ;1, 1947 
92 per cent of the total appropriation of $118,696,077 worth of aid had 
been delivered to Italy.l 
But during the summer of 1947 Italy had been stricken by a severe 
drought. The course of events, therefore, as -far as American. economic 
policy was concerned, followed its irrefutable logic. "With a- wheat harvest 
of only 68 per cent of its prewar volume," it was concluded, "the termin-
ation of United States relief shipments would bring an immediate catastrophe 
to Italy. 112 
Hence in November 1947 the State Department proposed to Congress a pro-
gram of aid to help Italy (together. with France and Austria) to survive 
economically until the program for European recovery, which began to materi-
alize at a fast rate of" speed .. following Secretary of State Marshall's speech 
at the Harvard Commencement exercises · in June · 194 7, could be fully worked. 
out and ready for implementation. In December 1947 Congress passed the 
1. u.s. Department of State, Second Report to Congress on the -United States 
Forei.gn Aid Program, Washington, 1948, p. 8. 
2. Ibid. 
71 
Foreign Aid Act (Public Law ~89, 80th Congress). This . program,. like the 
Foreign Relief Program, was to be impleme.nted by the State Department, ~s 
the same admini.etrative etruc.ture as - that already created for the latter 
program. It was regarded as - a further extension to the lengthening pipeline 
as it was being called, of relief. and economic .. aid .. to pro.vide. "the basic 
essentials of life during the- fi.rst four months of 1948. 11 1 
'!he · Political Context. 
All this, of course, must be seen upon a background of unnerving social 
and political instability in Italy. The six-party coalition which had 
emerged as the •government" of Italy as the war. ended had been· stalemated 
by its own internal animosi tie.s .. from the very beginning.. Finally, shortly 
after the UNRRA shipments ceased in early 1947, the Christian~Demacrats 
dissolved their ties with the Communists. The latter then .began an earnest 
·campaign to te.k:e political control of_ the country in the approaching electi 
of' April 1948. Already the Communia.t Party i.tself was · second in .membership 
only to that of the Soviet Union. and during 1947 it w:as making great gains 
in getting . electoral sup.port among both the southern peasantry and the 
northern laborers.2 
Howard Smith gives four factors whi.ch he thinks explain why the electoral 
support of the Communist Party, estimated at 51 per cent of the voting 
population in January 1948 turned out to be only ~0 per cent at the polls 
. in April. (1) .The anti-Communist elements controlled 82 per cent of. the 
press. (2) The anti-Communists spent seven times as much money in the 
1. u.s. Depar:tment of State, Second Report to Congress on the Foreign 
Relief Program, Washington, 1948, p. 8. 
2. Smith, State of Europe, pp. 219-220. 
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campaign as the Communiats. (;) The Catholic Church intervened- (in viola-
tion of its agreement; with the Italian Government made during the Fascist 
regime) with all its moral and material resources in favor of the Christian-
Democrats. (4) American intervention •. The last, he thinks, is the moat 
important. f'actor.l 
It is possible, of course, that the pre-election strength of the Com-
munist Party was more apparent than real, i.e., that the c~ Italians 
realized that a good. scare might resolve: the still doubtful American Senate 
on the passage of the Foreign Assistance Bill. If this was indeed the 
strategy of some of the vociferously "pro-Communis.t" Italians it worked 
100 per cent. The Italian elections became the unofficial deadline before 
which Congress had to act. The roreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Public Law 
472, 80th Congress) otherwise known as the Economic Cooperation Act or the 
Marshall Plan became law on April ~' 1948. The first Marsha-ll Plan boat 
docked in Italy just in time to give material evidenceof Ameri.can. inten-
tions before the people-went to the polls. On April 18-19 the Italian 
people for the first time. in their national history gave one party a clear 
parliamentary Jil,e..jori ty and in so doing clearly declared their adherence to 
the Western bloe. The election results are shown on Table 9 on the fol-
lowing page. 
IL Piano Mar shall 
The Marshall Plan originated partially out of a congressional desire to 
replace the seemingly aimle·es policy of meeting one emergency after another, 
one crisis on top of another, with excited spurts of stop-gap aid. The 
l. Smith, State of' Europe, P• 205. 
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TABLE 9 
RESULTS OF TEE ELECTIONS APRIL 18-19, 1948* 
Chamber of Deputiee Senate 
Party Popular % of Seats % of % of Seats vote total total votes 
Christian-Democrat 12, 751,84L 48.7 -,o7 5?·5 47.9 151 
Popular Front 
(Soc. and Comm.) 8,025,990 )0.7 182 )0.0 )1.0 115 
Right Socialists 1,860,528 7.1 ?? 5·7 7.0 
National Bloc 1,100,156 ).8 18 ).1 .... 25 
Monarchist s 729,987 2.8 14 2.4 .... 
Republicans 650,41? 2.5 9 1.6 .... . .. 
Italian Social Move-
ment (neo-Faacist) 525,408 2.1 6 1.1 .... . .. 
Others 618,644 2.) 5 1.0 1?.9 59 
* Source: Summarized from. Facts on File Yearbook, VIII, P• 115. 
Marshall Plan is our first attempt to make · a concerted attack on there-
oovery and other economic problems of sixteen European countries (plus the 
zones. of Germany and Austria occupied by the Western Powers ) . Thus Secre-
tary Marshall, speaking as the first witness at the Senate hearings empha-
sized, 11 The program is not one of a series of piecemeal relief measures. 
I ask you to note this difference and keep it in mind throughout our ex-
planations. The differeneeia absolutely vital.nl 
The vi tal differences ·· between the stop-gap measures . and the Marshall Plan 
include: (1) The Mar.shall . Plan involves. an enormously greater exp.endi ture 
of money over a four-year period t han was contemplated. during the peri.od of 
stop-gap thinking.. (2) The- Marshall Plan, unl ike the stop-gap measures, 
does not treat each country . separately but requires a. high degree of coop-
eration e.mong .sixteen etherwise sovereign nations. The sheer scope· of this 
task and the problems it presents of coordination and cooperat ion among 
1. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, European Recovery Program Hearings, 
Part I, Washington, 1948, p. 2. 
planning bodies and executing bodies belittles by f'ar the previous efforts 
in this direction. (3) '!he Marshall Plan has both a de:f'ini te goal and a 
de:f'ini te time limit. Its goal is no leas than. the restoration of a high 
level of' world trade. This is to be achieved by the restoration of' polit-
ical stability and economic prosperity in the individual participating 
countries,- by 1952. 
In brief the Marshall Plan is des.igned not. merely to extend the survival 
of stricken countr.ies in the Micawber-like hope that sooner or later some-
thing would turn up to banish all troubles. It is, rather, a program for 
getting at the roots of certain. economic ills and dealing with them at 
least to the extent that soon the diseases can be reduced to proportions 
that the individual countries can cope with by themselves. 
The general aims of the Marshall Plan recognize the merger of economics 
and poll tics. In March 1947 President Truman;. in a message to Congress, 
stated, "One of the objectives of the foreign policy of the United States 
is the creat ion of condi tiona in which we and other nations will be able 
to work out a way of life free from· caercion. wl The general tenor of this 
speech wasone of veiled criticism of the activities of the Soviet Union 
and international Communism• Nevertheless, inhis speech at Harvard in 
June, Secretary Marshall declared, 
1. 
2. 
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to 
do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, with-
out which there can be no political stability and no assured peaee.2 
.. 
He continued, 
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Our policy is directed not against anv country or doctrine but agains 
hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the re-
vival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social condi tiona in which free institutions can exist.l 
With the formation of the Cominform later that summer, however, the non-
partisanship of the policy was, of necees.i ty, reversed. Thus Seymour · Harris 
writing on the Italian elections, suggests, "Had the Ite.liansaccepted com-
munism, would they have received aid under E.R.P.? The answer undoubtedly 
is no. 112 
The preamble of the Foreign Assistance Act states its purpose · to be to 
promote world peace and the general welfare, the national inter&s·t and 
the foreign policy of the United States through. economic, financiaL and 
other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which 
free institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance- of 
the strength and stability of the United States. 
Section 102 of the. Act declares, 
The. restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of 
individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine· independence rests 
largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, stable 
international economic relationships and the achievement by the countries 
of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside 
assistance. 
It can be seen that the ends of our e.conomio foreign policy are politico-
economi.c and the means . are almost wholly economic. These economic means 
include such policies as . the encouragement of · the progresed.ve· breakdown 
and elimination of international trade barriers, emphasis on close inter-
national cooperation through joint organizations, and an attempt to restore 
to the. individual economies some measure of · independence from "extraordinary 
outside economic assistance. 11 
I I • ~ I ( :0 ,·. ~ • ... _; ' 
1. u.s. Department of State, Development of' theForeign Reconstruction 
Policy, p. 10. 
2. Seymour Harris, The European Recovery Program, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Presa, 1§48, P• 61. 
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The particular applioabili ty of the.se· general goals . and . aims to Italy 
is quickly apparent when we recall . the foregoing discussion of some of the 
more acute economic problems of · that country and their social and political 
ramifications. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE MARSHALL PLAN IN ITALY 
In considering the Marshe:lLPlan: in Italy three, question mus.t . be answered 
(1) How does · it function, i.e., what . techni~ue.s are use.d by the Uni.ted 
States to influence · I-talian e.eonomic' poli.ey? ( 2 ) Wha-t a or t of activity is 
it engaged in? (3) What is being.·. ac..complj.shed in Italy? 
Technique.s 
The matter of American· techniques. in . influencing the domestic policies 
of the Italian Government is alL-important. '!he uni.que~· characteristic of 
the Marshall Plan is not the subaidisation of one country's economy by the 
government of another (in the 18th century kings . often ga.ve each . other 
economic aid) but rather, that one ... country . is given the . privilege by another 
of having an important voice· in the. dir.ection of" the lat.ter 1e economy and 
related internal affairs. It means that .one country interyenes in the 
domestic policies · of' another• The problem · thereby created,. since · there is . 
no question of military coercion, touches the delicate and highly explosive 
subject of nationaL s.overeignty. 
The whole ques-tion arises, because" of a simple cons.id.eration. Give-n that 
it is desirable and. necessary tha.t the.· United States furnish huge amo~ts 
of money to Italy for economic assis.tanoe, hpw to insure tha.t .. !t will . be · 
used to the best intereats of both countr.ies. a.nd as effectively aa . possible? 
Clearly both eountries have a stake in the successfUl. use of the funds. 
Equally clearly, on the other hand, that question cannot be decided uni-
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laterally by either of' the two partie.s concerned. 
The question came up early in the congressional hearings on the European 
Recovery Program. 
Senator Hiokenlooper. Do you envisage at this time that these agree-
ments between the Administrator, or between our country and. foreign 
countries, will go to the point of' sybstantial undertakings on the , part 
of' these governments to insure · continuity of work in . their recovery 
ef'forts? 
Secretary Marshall. Just what do you mean by that, Senator? 
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, to prevent widespread atrikes and long 
work stoppages in their countries. 
Secretary Marshall. You are getting into a pretty serious political 
issue. I don 1t know. The problem applies over here as well aaover 
there. 
LHiekenlooper pressed for an answer, referring to the general strike 
in France in 194-iiJ 
Secretary Marshall. • • • I think we mus:t take an understanding view 
of the situation .. the · diff'.icultiea ·· of' the governments, what they are up 
against- and judge it from that roint of view rather than from any 
rigidity of opinion . on our part. 
~at the answer to senator Hickenlooper 1s question boils down .to iS that, 
given an agreement on the· final ob.jective, there never.thelee.s - w-111 .be. dif'-
ferences of' opinion between the United States Government and the Marshall 
Plan governments · as to. the intermediate objectives and . policies- for a~hiev-
ing these .. 'Ihese dif'f'er.encescan be· adjusted only by the -process of di-
plomacy baaed on mu.tual understanding . and confidence in each othar 1s ca-paci 
to make progress toward the agreed final. goal. 
The. fact remains that the United States is widely . distrust.ed in Europe. 
'Ibis attitude is especially, though by no means exclusively, prevalent 
among the Soeialiats, who still believe.· in the Marxist stereotype of' a 
capi tali.stie and imper-ialist i .e United State.a . wi.th. ulterior .mo.tivea. Europ-
eane, f'urther:more, tend to be snobbish toward Americans whom they believe 
1. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, European Recovery Program Hearings, 
PP• 62-63. 
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to be culturally inferior to themselves.! This attitude makes them all the 
more sensitive toward American interference in the domestic affairs for 
the purpose of helping their economic. recovery. 
The foregoing considerations are lucidly illustrated by a recent minor, 
but significant, diplomatic crisis that took place between the Italian 
Government and the American chief of the ECA Mission in Italy, Mr. Leon 
Dayton. Following its policy of aiding Italian economic recovery by hold-
ing down inflation and maintaining. financial stability in. the country the 
Italian Government during the year 1950 used very 1i ttle of the Marshall 
Plan funds allotted to it. While f-inancial stability was generally pro-
moted by this policy, unemployment increased because- the Government's t 
restrictive fiscal policy discouraged new capital from entering industry. 
Mr. Dayton held the social ins·tability promoted by large. scale unemployment 
to be a greater danger to Italian recovery and democracy than· the inflation 
that would be induced by increased governmental spending. 
Apparently Mr. Dayton and Mr. De Gaspari argued out the question without 
reaching any agreed course of action. The whole story broke.· into the 
American press, however, on October ;, 1950 when Arnaldo Cortesi, New York 
Times . correspondent in -Italy reported that ECA officials in Italy were dis-
satisfied with the, Government's policy of restricting economic expansion 
and refusing to use Marshall Plan funds .in an att empt to keep inflation 
down, even at the risk of risingunemployment.2 The results of this article 
probably could have been foreseen. 
1. Saul K. Padover, "America and Europe: Mutual Misunderstandings, 11 Social 
Research, XVII, Dec., 1950, pp. 406-409. 
2. Cortesi, New York Times, Oct. ;, 1950, pp. 1,19. 
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As a result of these, words ••• there has inevitably been Italian com-
ple.inte . of interference, dictatorship and even imperialism .. While these 
complaints come mainly from Communists, fellow travellers and neo-fa~cis 
they do point up a dilemma on the horms" of which Americana are bound to 
be impaled. On the one hand, we do not want to interfere in the. internal 
affairs of other nations; on the other, we have e. right to see that our 
aid is -not misused.l 
Prime Minister De Gasperi, speaking in the .Italian Chamber of Deputies, 
insisted that f inancial stabili~ was the real basis of political stabil ity 
and that inflation. is the .real threat to Italian r_,covery. Referring to 
the disastrous inflation immediately following the. war he· later said, nHe 
who has been scalded by hot water fears even t he cold.n2 
Obviously there was little point in further disturbing the" relations 
between the two countries in such critical days. Therefore on. October 7, 
1950 Mr. Dayton, in a letter to the Italian Government, repudiated the 
New York Times-· article of October ' as unauthorized and as an· erroneous 
interpretation of hie views. In the letter . he stated, 
More could have been ·done, more can be done and more will be done, 
because the imposing program of reconstruction on which we-have ·embarked 
together has given us. greater experience and greater capacity to coop-
erate in programs of reciprocal aid towards ends and objectives to which 
we .. aspire in common. 
I assure you that there isn't any essential difference between the 
Miseian and the Ministries with which we work.3 
Thus Italian pride was satisfied, the whole affair w.as. removed £rom the 
public eye and harmony was restored. No doubt some sort of' compromise ·be-
tween the two parties to the controversy will be achieved. But i ,t .will be 
achieved only at the conference table with both sides ai tting as e-quals in 
a cooperative venture. 
1. "Italy and E.C.A.," editorial, New York Timea., Oet. 24, 1950, p. 28. 
2. •La Kuova Faeedi Politica .Eoonomica initalia," Osservatore Romano, 
Oct. 12, 1950, P• 1. 
3. nNotizie Italiane, 11 Osservatore Romano, Oct. 7, 1950, P• 2. 
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Another techni.que of American foreign policy in Italy is the speech-
malting by American off'icia.la to bodies of private Italian citizens. Because 
the Italian industrialists are - relatively unrestrained and uncontrolled by 
the Government they have excellent opportunities to promote their selfish 
interests with little · interference from any quarter.. .. Some of the · reeul ts 
of this situa.tion,.such as. misdirected · investment, unwarra.ntedly high prof'i ts 
and prices far out of' the reach of ordinary consumers already have been 
mentioned in Ohapter 2. Mr. Dayton, therefore, has undertaken to visit as 
many chambers of commerce as he. can. There he tries · to taunt and otherwise 
she.keup groups of narrow-minded industrialists from whatever complacency 
they seem to have been· able to find. 
To the Genoa Chamber of' Commerce, for example, he addressed some remarks 
in the course of which heaccused his audience of paying mere lip. service 
to the- goal of raising the- Italian e.te.ndard of' living, and added, 
Italians possess a. toughness of fiber, e. desire to work and a pleasure 
of individual e.c.complisbment which ought to be · the j_qy of the most 
conservative economists. everywhere. You can choose to lead · them or you 
can, through inaction, let that leadership slip by default into the 
willing hands of' Joseph Stalin.l 
At another point in his speech Mr. Dayton became even mo.re lucid. 
Is there acyone here who believes that half-measures, half-cooperation 
and timid support of plans to vitalize democracy can win· a.n,ything except 
the privilege of hanging from the arcade of a. filling station?2 
Besides diplomacy and moral. suasion the United S.tates has . three contract-
ural means of influencing Italian economic policy (or that of' ~. Marshall 
Plan country). All involve the use of American funds. They are · (1) con-
1. "E.O.A. Aide Scores Business in Italy," New York Timest Oct. 20, 1950, 
p. 14. 
2. Aylmer Vallance,. "Report on Italy III, n New Statesman and Nation, Nov. 
4, 1950 • 
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ditionalaid, (2) direct grants and(~) direct loans. The relative im-
portance of these meana with respect to . each other may be suggested by a 
comparison of' the amount of. money expended through each one . of them as of 
June ~0, 1950, as shown in Table 10. 
TABLE 10 
DIRECT PROGRAN COSTS FOR ITALY TF..ROUGH JUNE ~0~ 1950* 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Expenditure by ~pe 
Direct Grants • • • • • • • 589.2 
Oondi tional Aid • • • • • 77 •. 6 
Loans • • • • 67.0 
Procurement authorized • • • 1,058.1 
Total procurement 
expenditures • • • • • 7~~.8 
*Source: Summarized from E.O.A., Ninth Re~ort to 
Congress, Washin~to~, Government Printing Office, 
Table E-~, P• 15 • 
Loans are negotiated only for purposes which the ECA approvesas being 
essential to the rec.overy of Italy. Interest on these. loans. is. at two and 
one-half per cent payable semi-annually begi.nning June ~0, 1952. The prin-
cipal is to be repayed in semi-annual installments from June ;o, 1956 to 
December ;1, 198~. 1 
Oondi tional aid is given by the ttni.ted States on condition that the re-
cei:dng country set aside an amount of i te own currency equal in value to 
the dollars it receives as a conditional aid grant. '!his special fund of, 
in this case, lire is used to help Italy's debtors in foreign trade· to 
finance some of their imports from Italy. We shall return to this subject 
later in considering .the IntrartEuropean Payments Union of which conditional 
· ~ aid is an essential part. 
1. E.O.A., Nin.th .Report to Congress, Washington, Government Printing Office 
p. 48. 
The use of' di.rect grants may be indicated by a short history of' · its 
development. Under the Uni.ted States Foreign Relief Program .(Public Law 84) 
the United States. would sen!:[ certain needed. commodities .. to .italy. . The 
commodities (both industrial and consumer) would be sold by the Italian 
Government and the receipts , from that sale would be placed in a "local 
currency fund • or 11 counterpart fund". These funds could qe used . only for 
purposes agreed upon by both the United States and the Italian Government, 
such as · debt retirement, promotion of' production, temporary or permanent 
withdrawal of money from circulation with a view to fighting inflation, and 
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The · Foreign Relief Program . 
and later programs also provided that five ::. pe r cent of the local currency 
fund of a participating country be used for the .. purpose of financing the 
cost of administering the European Recovery Program in that country, leaving 
95 per cent for the use of aubs.:tanti ve programs. 
It will be noted that underthe Foreign. Relief Program . the local. currency 
fund was enriched only as the American goods were sold. Under the later 
Foreign Aid Program (Public Law. )89) the Italian Government we.& required to 
depoei t in the · local currency ·fund a sum of lire equivalent to the dollar 
value of the American commodities received .- as soon as these were lan,ded. 
The Italian Government could then reimbur.s.e itself as it sold the goods. 
This scheme has been continued under the Marshall Plan. 
Table 10 at.ove shows direct grants, i.e., the . counter.p.art funds to be 
the chief instrument of American economic policy in Italy. But thi.e, ins 
mentis a two-handled one, and Italy holds one of the handles. Thus. the 
E.CA may want Italy to increase governmental, expend:i tures but Italy may 
refuse to do this either by not agreeing to the project propo·sed by ECA or . 
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by not spending the money after 1 t has been made-available by ECA. It was 
a situation such as this,- that led to the · temporary crisis between Italy 
and the -ECA Mission in Italy as descri.bed above. 
Thus the essential nature of the Marshall Plan. as a cooperative under-
taking between the United States and, in our case; Italy, stands out. The 
benefits of American eeonomio .policy in ltaly .will accrue· to both countries, 
in the form of better living. condi tiona for Italy and international peace 
and security for the United States. There can be-no question, therefore, 
of one country . eoercing the other. Paul Hoffman, former Director of ECA, 
has . stated, 
Here, I believe, is the supreme. political significance of the E.O.A.: 
it has developed teohniftu.ea of collaboration under which . a pow.erf ul 
nation like the u.s. could establish an effective working partnership 
with a less powerful nation without exacting from the latter any sur-
render of the right to rule itself. The E.C.A. ia, therefore the first 
major experime.nt in the history of world politics where a strong power, 
while parti8ipating in the. internal affairs of a weaker one, has not 
only refused to infringe upon freedom of choice, but rather invoked 
every means to conserve that. freado.m..l . 
Some Marshall . Plan Programs 
American economic foreign policy toward I .taly cent.ere · upon the Marshall 
Plan. There are two types . of activities - involved in carrying out that 
policy. 'Jbe first is comprised of individual Marshall Plan projects to 
accomplish various specific, short-term goals. The second type of activity 
takee place on e. broader plane involving the creation of an atmosphere o~ 
intra-European and general. international cooperation to help bring about - ~ 
certain long-range conditione of economic prosperity and political stability 
l. Paul Hoffman, "Most Courageous Comeback in History,N Life, Feb. 5, 1951, 
p. 102. 
The Marshall Plan projects aim. chief'ly .. at .increasing production in Italy 
and reviving the · economic life . of' the country. 
After exhausti.ve study EOA and the Italian. government. agreed upon 
an over-all recovery program that emphasized 1) machines f'or gutted 
factories, 2 ~ po.wer to run the machines and ~) more land and improved 
land cultivation.! 
Some of' the individual programs · include: 
(1) A loan of' $2? million to the Fiat pl.ant at Turin which had. been 
75 per cent destroyed. The plant is now producing 100,000 passenger · cars 
a year · in addition to busses . and trueks.2 
(2) New piping, turbines and drilling equipment was provided for the 
restoration and expansion. of the geothermic electric generating plants in 
Lardarello, 'nleoacy. These -plants; which us.e volcanic . a.:team. to. generate 
electricity, were destroyed · by the -retreating Germans during the war. They 
are now producing one billion· kilowatts of electric! ty per year and will 
be producing twice that by 1952.~ 
(.~) A total of 200 separa.te projects for land reclamation and improve-
ment are being financed by Marshall . Plan counterpart funds. 4 Twenty-three 
per cent of Marshall Plan funds for Italy, in fact, are· used in the agri-
cultural sector.5 
Among the agricultural. programs. for Italy are: 
(1) The introduction of' hybrid corn to Italian farmers to increase the 
yield of their land.6 
1. Hoffman, Li:f'e, XXX, Feb. 5, 1951, P• 100. 
2. Ibid. ---- ~. Ibid., pp. 100-101. 4. Ibid., p. 102. 
5· ~A., A Look at the M:ar&h&ll Plan .in Ac.tion, Washington, 1950, 
(unpaginated). 
6. Otto Zausmer; Marshall Plan Goals and Gains, Washington, 1950, p. ~. 
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(2) A program .of technical assistance · to aid in. a :t,hree"""Y'ear program of 
land reclamation covering 2.5 million acres of marshland (three times the 
size of Rhode Island) .1 
()) An irrigation project being. planne.d for an area· of about one and one-
half million acres : calculated to increase the number of people employable 
on the land by 200 per cent.2 
(4) A land reclamation project of around 56,000 acres between Rome and 
Naples.) 
(5) Cooperation between ECA and the Rockerf'eller Foundaticm .has sue-
ceeded in virtually wtping out malaria· on the island of Sardinia. '!he · ECA 
has persuaded. the. Italian Government to undertake. e. program of development 
there, now that the idand is habitabl.e, which, when completed, will make 
it possible for Italy to export around a million persons. there.4 
Tables ll and 12 below indicate further examples · of s-pecific Marshall 
Plan programs for the use of eount.e:rpart funds. 
TABLE ll 
PROJECTED PROGRAMS APPROVED BY ECA IN ITALY, NOVEMBER, 1948~ 
'!Ype of Project 
Agricultural deyelopment • • • 
Public work1, including housing • 
Rehabilitation of merchant ships • 
Expansion of industrial facilities 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Lire 
(billions) 
70 
55 
15 
Cost 
122 . 
96 
26 
including steel . . and transportation. • 102 177 
Development of tourist facilities • • 8 14 
Total • • • • • 250 425 
*Sources: Compil ed from E.O.A., 'lhird Re.port to Congress, p. 44 and E.C.A., 
Fourth Report to Congress, Washington, Government Printing Press, 1949, 
P• 67. 
1. Zausmer, Marshall Plan Goals; p. ). 2. ~., P• 50. 
). E.C.A., A Look· at the Marihall Plan. 
4. "Italy to Re-settle 1,000,000 Persons on Sardinia, vi th ECA Guidance," 
New York Times, July15, 1950, PP• 1, 5· 
TABLE 12 
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS APPROVED BY ECA IN ITALY 
OCTOBER TO DECEMBER, 1949* 
Type of Project 
Power • • 
Petroleum refining 
Air transport • 
Industrial 
equipment • 
Total • • 
• 
• 
• 
Number of 
Projects 
2** • 
1 • 
1 • 
1 • 5 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Total Cost (millions 
of dollars~and dollar 
equivalents) 
• 18.5 • • 
• 6.4 • • 
• 5·5 • • 
2.0 • • 
• ,2.4 • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ECA Commitment 
(millions of 
dollars) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
12.7 
1.8 
4.5 
1.4 
20.5 
* Source: E.C.A., Seventh Report to Congress, Washington; Government 
Pr.inting Office, 1950, p. 4,. 
** These projects are for the purchase of two 50,000-kilowatt turbo-genera-
tore, one to be installed at Genoa, the other at Porto Marghera near 
Venice. 
How these programs f'i t Italian needs .. is immediately clear. The programs 
designed to increase electric power output,. for example, are -etnential to 
an expanded and active industry and will eventually reduce Wlemployment and, 
to that extent, so-called overpopulation. The land reclamation and irri-
gation programs are~ as. wa& mentioned in the -chapter. on agriculture, es-
pecially germane to the - proglem of relieving agricul tur.al overpopulation. 
The fact that Italy at present needs more and improved arable land rather 
than the means to speed up cultivation cannot be overstreseed. The . improve-
ment of land and the use of better seeds to increase crop yields are, of' 
course, essential for successful agrarian reform. 
The picture is not so rosy as it appears at first sight, however, for the 
rate at whi.ch these projects are carried forw-ard depends .on the Italian 
Governmen.t and we have seen that that government tends to put more faith in 
classical policies _of financial soundness. than on a Keynesian policy of 
full employment. Therefore unemployment continues -to. hold firm at around 
two million and the consequent social instability caused by this fact tends 
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to obscure the progress the country ie . making toward a sound economy. 
Stimulation of Foreign Trade 
While the foregoing . ECA programs try to promo.te an active domestic 
economy., American f'o.reign policy is also at work on the international plane 
to try to insure that the domestic gains of Marshall Plan countries can be 
maintained when Ameri.can assistance.· shall have been withdrawn. We have -
already seen Italy 1s extreme · dependence on international. economic. condi.tiona 
for. its own economic . health. This dep.endence. not . only r efers to I .talian 
industry but also to Italian agriculture. none moves from the problems of 
the agrarian south," Einaudj. wri te.s, "to- the . issues of European unity and 
to the creation of those larger free markets which a new Europe must attempt 
to establish as a condi ti.On of 1 ts survival. nl It is with this thought in 
mind that American policy-makers have ·embarked upon an earnest miss ion to 
revive intra-European trade. 
At the end of the war the domestic economies. of the European countries 
were so unstable and unproductive that Europeancurrencies · became inconvert-
ible. European countri.es. generally would accept only dollars for their ex-
ports, knowing. that with dollars - they could buy needed. materi.als . in the 
United States or anywhere else in the world. For example, if France sent 
ir.on ore to Italy in return for · lire, she .could not. buy cod with those lire 
because Italy does not produce coal·. Only if, let us say, Belgium . intended 
to buy some Italian. oranges .could France be certain that Belgium would ac 
Italian lire in return for its coal. '!bus 
I 1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, PP• 26-27. 
man,y countries found that they .had substantial credits and. debits in 
other countries without bei.ng able to offs.et one · against the other. An 
immediate result was the shrinkage of tradet due to the. desire of the 
trading countries· to balance thei.r bilateral accounts .1 
T'nus grave. commodi.ty shortages.' we.re· aggravated . and. Eur.opee.n countries 
had to use precious dollars which were needed t .o buy. goods in the United 
States in trading among: themselves. 
The reeul t of this. situation w.as · the first Agreement. -for Intra ... Euro.pean 
Pe.y:men.te.· and .. Com.penea.Uons eigned . by all Marshall Plan countries and Western 
occupied Germany e.nd Austria onOctober 16., 1948 (effective- as of the first 
of that month). The plan was w.orked out by EOA in cooperat ion with its 
European counterpart, the Office of European Economi.c Cooperation ( OEEO~). 
The Agreemen..t provided for a limited sys:tem whereby European countries -could 
use their credits with one. country to offset their debts (to a lim.i ted ex-
tent) with a.nothe.r. As an ince·ntive t the United States- us.ed. conditional 
aid dollars. Italyt for . examp.le., set up . a... fund of lire· equivalent to $47.3 
million which certain European. countries trading . with .Italy could draw 
upon e.t a fixe.d rate. to finance .. their imports. from, Italy. Italy i ts.elf 
could finance i .ts. imports from other European ... countries" to . the· extent of' 
$27 million. Whenever Italy extended credit from its., fund to . one of i .ts. 
debtors the United States: would give Italy the equhralent of that amount in 
dollars, which Italy could than use to buy commodities in America. These 
dollars were . part of the original amount scheduled to go to . . Italy under · the 
Foreign Asaietan.ce- Act. Thus, in e.ff'ect, the · United States, using dollars 
as bait, forced the Eur.o.pean countries to lilncrease, trade among themse1ves.2 
1. E.O .A., Second Report to Congres-s, Washington; Government Printing 
Office, 19li'9t PP• 11-12. 
2. A full explanation may be found in E.O.A.,Second. Report to Congress, 
p. 11 ff. 
The clearing .house for the complicated accounting involved was the Bank of 
International Settlements at Basle, Switzerland. The first Agreement ex-
pired June )0, 1949. At that time. a . secoli..Agreement. came into effect with 
provisions designed to remove certain rigid.i:t.ies in the first (nations are 
very loath .to part with any economic sovereignty, even when economic and 
political disaster etares , them · in the · face). '!he. second Agreement was fol-
lowed by a third which expired bn June· )0, 1950. 
These, agreements were really interim arre.ngements to tide the European 
countries over the period of time that it took to work out a more flexible 
system. In vune, . 1950 the OEEC e.p.proved a European Payments Union. '!he 
Union is a refinement of the previous agreements. Under it, Italy can fin-
ance imports from other countries, ~ or itc.an let other countries finance 
imports from Italy, to the extent of '205 million "uni.ts of equivalent 
account" (at present this means. $205 million) within the next two years.l 
Congress, on June 5, 1950, amended the Foreign Assistance Act by Public 
Law 555 to allow ECA dollars to help the Union (EPU) get started.2 
.Meantime the European countries themselves, stimulated: by the great 
degree of cooperation already achieved, are suggesting more plans with a 
view to creating a unified European economy with a single competitive 
market in order to gain the. enormous, advante.gee which the United States, 
I 
with its own gigantic. domestic market, hasdemonstrated to be possible. 
The French have suggested the Schuman Plan which calls for the. integration 
1. E.C.A., Ninth Report to .Congress, pp. 27-28. The bade agreement and 
all related documents for the establishment of EPU may be foWld in 
E.C.A., . Ninth Re-port To C.ongress, Supplement, Washington, Government 
Printing Office, 1951. 
2. E.C.A., Ninth Report to Congress, n. 1, P• 29. 
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of the iron and steel industries of France and Germs.n;y- and aims at a more 
rational distribution of these essential eom.m.odities in Europe. Italy 
will participate in this venture. which, if it works out, will .be an 
benefit to it. '!he basic agreement for the Schuman Plan was -signed on 
March 19, 1951 and indications · are that it will be. ratified by all the 
countries invited to participate (including Italy) except Great Britain. 
Italy, too, has contributed sugg~stions toward. an. integrated European econ-
omy. The Pella Plan presented by Italy to. OEEC in July, 1950 called for a 
preferential tariff agreement,. among. European. countries, with American con-
sent, and was · designed to help. relieve Italian overpopulation.! 
Needless to say, American foreign policy has officially encouraged all 
European attempts to create a -unified European economy. As waa. seen in 
the discussion of Italy's economic problems, an integrated European economy 
would benefit no country more than Italy. 
Emigration Policy 
As we have seen, although there is some hope that Italy may eventually 
be able to support its population at a reasonable standard. of living an 
immediate need is to relieve Italy of its present overpopulation so that 
at least a start may be made in economic recovery without that additional 
burden. 
Because of the great restrictions on immigration established by most 
countries, including the United States, Italy's opportunities for export-
ing its excess population. are limited at best. The United States has help-
ed Italy to find "markets", so to speak, for its human exports. 
1. Howard C. Gary, "The Economic Picture," Foreign Policy Reports, XXVI, 
Oct. 15, 1950, P• 128. 
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In July, 1950 the ECA announced a program financed by one million dollars 
to help overpopulated countri-es,, principally Italy and --Germany, to fin¥mce 
emigration overseas.l The rehabilitation of Sardinia, when- it is completed 
with the help of Marshall. Plan fund.e.;. is expec.ted to allow that island to 
absorb one-half the annual population grow-th of Italy for · five years .2 
Meantime the Italian Government has . been promoting ag.reements for the 
emigration of Italians capable. of working to countries with labor shortages. 
France is an especially fruitful . field for such agreements because it has 
a labor shortage, especially in_ its mines, and its way of life is similar 
to the Italian. Several agreements were reached between. the French and 
Italian authorities -whereby a considerable number of Italians could have 
gone to France. An agreement reached: on February 22, 1946 called for 
French recruitment of 20,000 workers for theFrench mines. An agreement 
reached November 24, 1946 called for recruitment of 270,000 agricultural 
and industri~l workers for France during 1947.~ A special agreement was 
made on February ~, 1948 for sending agri.cul tural workers to France. 4 
But so many administrative difficulties were encountered and the terms 
for the disposal of the. wages that the Italians would earn in France- were 
so complicated and . unfavorable- to the worker concerned that very few Ital 
(who are not anxious to leave their homes a."ld families anyway) actually 
1. 
2. 
~. 
4. 
~~Plan ,by EOA- AJki Added_~ Ein1_gration~'" ~-New York Times, July 17, 195Q,p. 10 
"Italy- to · Resettle 1,000,000 Persons," New York Times·, July 15, 1950, 
pp. 1,15. 
"ll'ranco-Italian Migration Agreements," International . Labor Review., LV, 
May, 1947, PP• ~96-~98. 
"Italian Agricultural Emigration to France," International Labor Review, 
LVIII, Jan., 1949, P• 80. 
migrated to France .1 In June., 1950 Italy was still negotiating with both 
France and Belgium to :f'aci~itate· the movement of' workers to those countries. 
An indirect aid to both emigrati.on. and production, meanwhile, has been 
the subject of' extensive and prolonged negotiation be.tween Italy and France, 
with the United States being kept fully informed all. the while and lending 
its moral support to both powers.~ This is the - proposed Franco-Italian 
Customs Union. 
French and Italian representatives began to study the problems of' a 
customs union .in the summer·· of' 1947 and concluded, in a final report by a 
Mixed Commission that within the." framework of' such a customs. ~ion a.gri-
cultural specialization and perha.p.s even the . coordination of their respect! 
industrial sectors was technieally .:f'easible and that "with respect to labor 
and manpower, the customs, union was possible and even desirable.n4 The 
Final Report, December, 1947 was . highly optimistic. It express.ed the opini · 
that while the economie.s of' the. two countries are competitive in certain 
areas, such as in the textile, mechanical, pharmaceuti.cal and some phases 
of the food processing and luxuries industries, they-were - complementary in 
certain other areas. For examp~e,. Italy could .. supply France with hemp, raw 
silk, sulphur, mercury, essential -oils and raw hides, in exchange for iron 
ore, scrap, sheet steel, coal, combed wool and chemical products.5 
1. 
2. 
~. 
4. 
5· 
The talks on the customs union also took up the question of' Italian 
C:f'. both International. Labor Review, LV, May, 1947, pp. ~95-4o2 and 
International Labor Review, LVIII, Jan., 1949, PP• 80-84. 
E.C.A., Ninth Report to Congress, p. 1?. 
Howard J. Hilton, Jr., "The Franco-Italian CUstoms Union, 11 State Depart-
ment Bulletin, XXI, Aug. 15, 1949, p. 204. 
Ibid., PP• 20?-205. 
Ibid., p. 206. 
="-'-='--'============-~~--- -- ~-=====-===n= --=-~ = 
emigration but Italy was not able to supply the skilled workers which France 
requested.l It was nevertheless agreed that gradual steps could be taken 
by both countries, and any others which might care to join, toward accomplis 
ing a unified labor me.rket.2 Both countries signe.d a, protocol on March 20, 
1948 expressing formally the desire to f orm a customs union and providing 
. for a !wlixed . Commission to determine the terms of such an undertaking and 
to arrive at a program for its realization.~ Presumably this commission is 
still at work, probably taking as a further frame of reference the Schuman 
Plan. 
The curious fact is that an Italo-Frenoh customs union, and a great 
· degree of cooperation in the solving of economic problems in Europe, was 
no less desirable before the war than afterward. Much of the cooperation, 
of course, has been inspired by the hardships common to all the European 
countries. But it cannot be denied that American aid at every s.tep has 
been essential to such cooperation. Italy, of course, which can achieve 
economic well-being and with it the social and political stability which a 
strong and democratic government requires only within the larger framework 
of a maximally integrated European economy stands to be among the chief 
beneficiaries of American economic foreign policy toward Europe in general. 
Agrarian Reform 
Much of the social unrest in Italy arises from the diesatis£action of 
the Italian peasant with the system of land tenure. It was mentioned in 
Chapter 1 that while the crop sharers, the mezzadri, are :: a relatively 
stable class the day laborers, the braccianti, are a source of social and 
1. Hilton, State Department Bulletin, XXI, Aug. 15, 1949, p. 210. 
2. Ibid., PP• 205-206. 
~. Ibid., p. 207. 
political instability. The initiative in dealing with agrarian discontent 
lia&-wi th the Italian Government. The . United States can aid it by supply-
ing the Italians with resources in certain fields to free other resources 
for use in carrying out land ref orms. 
Premier Alcide De : Gasperi proposed a plan earlyin 1949 for the ex-
propr.iatio.n of' certain.:. inefficiently eul tivated lands for redistribution 
to landless peasants. Certain elements within the Christian-Democratic 
Party, however, blocked further actionon the proposals until they were 
faced with peasant riots and the forcible t~~ng over by landless peasants 
of' great portions. of' unworked estates, especially in the South. In the 
face of' this pressure the -dissident Christian-Democrats recognized what 
should have been obvious to them from the. start, namely, that redistribution 
of farmland is ·nec&ssary if agrarian stability is to be achieve in Italy. 
But by that time, aswehave noted, peasants were already squatting on 
150,000 hectares- of' land and having. bitter :fights with landlords. 
In the spring of 1950 the Italian Pe.~liament passed . the Sila Act.l This 
Act set up the Sila Authority (Ente Sila) which is tho appropriate land :from 
all eetates in Calabria of over 750 acres for the purpose of' resettling 
5,000 peasant families (on plote of' from 12 to 20 acres) and reintegrate 
the f ragmentary holdings of 4,000 other f'amilies.2 
This Act was the first phase of' the reform program announced by De 
Gasperi in 1949 which contemplates ultimately the expropriation of' ).75 
million acres of land now being held in large and inefficient holdings 1· -
1. "Land Re~orm in Italy, 11 Times (London) Oct. 14, 1950, p. 5· 
2. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, P• )). 
for redistribution to 250,000 peasant families.l This program already is 
being implemented. 
In January,l950 the Government introduced the Segni Bill. In October, 
1950 the Chamber of Deputies already had passed it and the. Senate had 
completed debate on the measure and. was expected to pass it shortly.2 The 
Segni Bill applies to the whole of Italy and contemplates the expropriation 
and redistribution of parts of estates over 750 acres in area, the amount 
of expropriation to depend on the relative efficiency :ot the estate. The 
total amount of land to be expropriated under this bill will amount to 
1,750,000 acres.; 
Industrial. Production 
The trend in Itali.an industrial . production is, perhaps, the most en-
couraging indication of the progress of Italian recovery. The level of 
physical output reached the pre-war level (19;8) during. 1949 and still is 
rising.4 Nevertheless existing plant capacity has not yet been fully 
utilized and the increase in population since 19;8 has not yet been absorbed 
into the economy. Plans have been announced for the reorganiz.ation of the 
mechanical industry (which is largely government controlled) and for a 
reform of the tax system.5 The. latter is important for if a. system of tax-
ation can be enforced it can be us.ed as an. anti-inflation wee.pon to offset 
the effects of increased governmental spending. Even this is unlikely, how-
ever, because Italian economists, as we have seen, still are wary of insti-
1. Einaudi, Social Reaearch, XVII, March, 1950, p. ;o. 
2. "Land Reform in Italy," Times (London) Oct. 14, 1950, p. 5· 
;. Ibid. 
4. E:"a':"A., Ninth Report· to Congress, p. 109. 
5· "Italy to Resettle 1,000,000 Persons·, n New York Times, July 15, 1950, 
p. 15. 
97 
tuting a full-employment policy. We have already seen why this is eo. In 
a pDor country such as Italy, with i ts strong suscepti.bility to inflation, 
·the authorities are more than ordinarily cautious about the speed of in-
dustrial expansion. Americans in Italy, on the . other hand, think that the 
authorities are so over-cautious that they are defeating their own ends. 
There is every indication that ·the American point of view is at least making 
some headway, aided by the expansionary f orces generated by the increased 
defense expenditures throughout the world since the Korean conflict be~an. 
At any rate, leaving aside the moral question of the eufferd:ng endured by 
the Italian people on account of prolopged unemployment, a good case may 
I 
be set forth (as was shown in Chapter 2) for either side of the economic 
question of Italy's recovery. 
Meantime, the . volume of Italian foreign trade, on which Italian industry 
is so dependent, has not yet shown a significant rise in trend since 1947.1 
Most of this is due to the· high prices of Italian goods on a highly com-
petitive world market and the apparent inability of Italian salesmen to 
"push" their products. 'lhus despi.te the progress made in unblocking the 
flow of world trade and even despite the steeply rising trend in intra-
European trade2 which attests to the success of Marshall Plan policies, 
. Italy is still faced with a low level of foreign trade. This points up the 
fact that in the last analysis Italy's recovery depends on the Italians 
themselves. The United States has done just about all it can do when it 
has injected new blood (in the form of Marshall Planfunds) into the econ-
omy and has sent a determined ~~. Dayton to give Italian industrialists a 
1. E.C.A., Ninth Report to Congress, pp. 15, 116. 
2. Ibid., P• 18. 
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much deserved verbal castigation. 
Employment 
The hard core of 2,000,000 unemployed still preeists .. today in Italy, 
changing only with seasonal fluctuations in the economy. Wh~t this means 
is that Italy 1s economy is expanding at best only rapidly enough to absorb 
the annual increase in the labor force but not enou!h to take up the alack. 
This situation means that Italy still has within itself the seeds of poli t-
ical and social disintegration. But we must recall that: (1) Italy ha• 
gone through a long period of chaotic economic, social and political con-
ditions the effects of which are not erasable within the span of a few 
years and (2) the world in general baa not yet recovered from the economic, 
social and political dislocations caused by the late war. 
It might well be asked at this point, "Why does Italy, while in the midst 
of recovery and rehabilitation efforts, still have unemployment while Great 
Britain, also engaged in its own recovery and rehabilitation program, has a 
labor shortage?" Thi.s question, it is ho.ped, has already largely. been 
answered but .<. the answer bears repeating. 
Population growth in Italy is much greater than population growth in 
Britain. Too, Great Britain has coal and some iron deposits; Italy has not, 
i.e., the fonner has the ·minimumrequiremente for a vigorous industry, the 
latter has not. Great Britain has a long established market relationship 
with . the vast British Commonwealth and .. Empire (further cemented by prefer-
ential tariff agreements since 19;1); Italy has no such thing. The British 
tolerate economic controls, Italians do not. 
All these -factors ara summarized in the fact that Britain has been ~ble 
to pursue a full employment policy, Italy has not. (Of course we m.ight add 
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that the British Government has desired a full employment .policy, the 
Italian Government has not.) But what does full employment mean? From the 
Italian point of view not too much. For the Russians, too, with their 
fiveyear plans, have had a full employment economy, in effect, for almost 
twenty-five -years. Yet it isdoubtful that the. Ruesiana are as -well off 
as the English,- or even as the Italians.. In short, "full employment" does 
not necessarily mean prosperity or even economic well-being,- as the 
English people themselvesare- beginning to suspect. Unemployment is one 
Italian social problem. It is a serious problem. But it is not the only 
problem and can't, and shouldn't, be. attacked alone. This is not to say 
that unemployment shouldn't be attacked at all, or e.ven that it shouldn 1t 
be a prime consideration in promoting Italian recovery. Unemployment .must 
receive more attention, and certainly more attention than the Italian 
Government ha.a. thus far given it. Unless this is done the Italian. Govern-
ment will continue to be vulnerable, and quite deservedly, to the accusation 
tha.t its orthodox economic -policy is being pursued. not merely to achieve 
economic stability but to prolong the exploitation of the Italian people by 
the industrialists and the landlords. 
But, in any case, there is no . bas.i.s for hoping. that Italy will recover 
overnight. Neither· is there· basis for thinking that Italy wi.ll never re-
cover at all. Econ.omic development is not characterized by an even rate of 
progress (or of regression, . either). There may be periods when the forces 
of progress are gather-i.ng strength, sucking up a nati.on 1e resources seemi 
without prospect of future re-turns. Then· there may come· a . sudden spurt of 
progress which mightwell far outstrip all predicted goals. At the end of 
the war Italy was in such an economically (and socially) weakened condi.tion 
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that to expect it to make the kind of economic progre·ss that other countries 
have been able to make is to expect a chronically anaemic patient to respond 
as quickly to treatment as a patient who had merely gone hungrY for a week. 
Poverty, including unemployment, was the lot of the majority of Italians 
long before World War II came llpon the scene. Yet poverty is decreasing 
in Italy, 1however slowly. But the Marahall Plan is not aimed at making 
every Italian rich within four years. It is aimed at making the Italians 
independent of outside help to as great a degree as possible. What is 
being done in Italy today is the planting of the seeds of a new life. 
That the seeds are doing a little better than holding their own may be an 
indication of a vigorous plant in the future. But the fruition of the plant 
may well not take place for some years. 
1. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, p. 615. 
101 
CHAP'!ER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Re.oapi.tulation 
In the preceding chapte-rs we have seen that: 
(1) Italy is agriculturally depressed as a result of poor land, lack of' . 
modern farming equipment and a feudal pattern of land tenure over a large 
area of the country. 'Ihe resultant poverty is aggravated by an excess pop-
ulation trying to live on the land. Thus a grave agrarian social problem 
is created. 
(2) Italy is lacking in industrial resources and this, in conjunction 
with a. depression in its foreign trade, makes for a vicious circle · in which 
both the lack of trade and the lack of domestic resources alternate as 
cause and effect. The resultant of these forces is a seemingly irreducible 
army of two million unemployed persons which a high rate of population 
growth replenishes as · fast e.s Italy 1seeonomy can absorb them. Thus there 
is generated a grave industrial social problem. 
(~)As a result of the agricultural and industrial depression with all 
their pernicious eff ects the -social-political situation in Italy has been, 
and remains today, potentiallyexplosive. 
(4) Italy 1s social problems, however, have beenshown to be solveable, or 
at least capable of a great degree of amelioration, and largely in economic 
terms. '!he United States, operating on this thesis, has been pursuing a 
policy of exploiting the possibilities of a solution or amelioration. through 
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economic action, and of urging a hesitant I.talian Government and an ob-
stinate ruling class toward faster progress. 
(5) Measurable progress has. been made in Italy, through Italian-American 
cooperation, toward solving the basi-c social problems in Italy. 
Conflicting Opinions over the Marshall Plan 
There is, curiously enough, a controversy over whether Italy has indeed 
been benefited by Marshall Plan aid and American economic foreign policy 
in general. Giulio Pastore, the Director of the newly formed non-Communist 
Free Italian .Genera.! Confederation of Labor, probably voicing the opinion 
of a great majority of Italians, has stated, "WithoutE.R.P. assistance I 
would be lost. It has saved the-. Italian economy. By providing bread and 
raw materials, the Marshall Ptan has kept both our people and our factories 
going.nl 
On the other hand, a unionist in the North (taken, no doubt, as typical 
of a certain section of Italian public op-inion) has been reported as claim-
ing that "Marshall Aid -has done two things for Italy, it has filled our 
shops with luxuries ·and our streets with unempl.oyed. n2 This opinion echoes 
. a report by Basil Davidson in the New Statesman and Nation in August, 1949 
wherein it was concluded, 
l. 
2. 
;. 
that American intervention and the }~arshall Plan have not brought about 
the resurrection and the enlivening of Italy, but have propped up a 
system and a structure of society which can no longer exploit or even 
contain, but in order to survive must severely cut down and cramp, the 
energies and exuberance of' this fruitful and ingenious people. ~'11 thout 
this intervention and all it has meant the way might have lain free for 
a new and positive development.3 
C~F. Miller, "Europe Now," American Federationist, LVI, March, 1949, 
p. 200. 
Vallance, New Statesman and Nation, Oct. 28, 1950, P• 385. 
Basil Davidson, "••• And Heaven Too III," New Statesman and Nation, 
Aug_. 13, 1949, P• 168. 
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Such opinions as these of the Messers Vallance and Davidson demonstrate 
how merely the sight of abject poverty stirs the passions for social revol-
ution: regardless of the objective facta. One can imagine how much more 
this is true of those who are actually experiencing the observed poverty. 
Even so, it is probable , that these Bnglishmen are much more- emotionally 
stirred up by Italian poverty than most Italians themselves, for the 
latter have never known the material comforts of life enjoyed in an econom-
ically more advanced country. 
The thinking of these two gentlement, nevertheless, seems to be warped 
and twisted in an effort to conform to the stern demands of a radically 
Socialist frame of reference. Their writings reveal a blind faith in 
violent revolution as a · panacea for Italy's ills as well as a transparent 
attempt to rationalize the Communist Party line · with regard to the United 
States and the Marshall Plan. These and other wri tars seem to think that 
a social reconstruction of Italy is the sine- qua non of Italian economic 
recovery. '!hey forget that Italy's poverty can be explained, as has been 
done here, in terms other than its class structure. A class structure in 
Italy completely di f ferent from the one · that now. exists might do. as much 
for that country as a store of coal equal, let us say, to the RUhr Valley's. 
But Italy has neither the · latter nor the former. And it might be as dis-
astrous for Italy to overturn its class strolcture all at once as it would 
be to try to conquer the RU.hr. But there are other . ways for Italy to get 
the Ruhr 1s coal. And th.ere are other ways, as this paper is trying to show, 
of revamping Italy's class structure. 
Mr. Vallance suggests that full employment is a solution to Italy 1s 
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economic difficulties.! But full employ.ment is not a means but an end, 
just as unemployment is not a cause but a sympton. of Italy's economic 
troubles. 
Mr. Vallance also alleges that American economic foreign policy is doing 
Italy great harm by preventing that country from t rading with the countries 
of Eastern Europe which, he claims, is "Italy's natural complement in the 
exchange of goods.n2 It 
It has already been shown that Italy can achieve a sound economy only 
within a f ramework of international cooperation for the purpose of main-
tai ning a high level of world trade, and that this is a basic aim of Ameri 
foreign policy. In this sense Eastern Europe certainly is apart of I taly's 
"natural" complement in the- exchange of goods. The United States- recognized 
this fact from the very beginning by providing in its calculations concern-
ing European rehabilitation the. a sub&tantial amount of trade be encouraged 
between East ern and Western Europe.) International political developments 
have nullified this plan. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Eastern 
Europe has played a traditional but relatively small part in Italy's foreign 
trade. From 191) to 19)8, for instance, over 50 per cent (and often 60 per 
cent or over) of' Italy's foreign trade (both imports and exports) was 
on with the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, 
Argentina and the Italian. dependencies. 4 
The most important source of imports during and in the years following 
World War I was the United States and in the- 'Ihirties Germany resume.d its 
1. Vallance, New Statesman and Nation, Nov. 4, 1950, P• 4oL 
2. Ibid. 
). E.C.A., A Report on Recovery Progress and United States Aid, Washington, 
1949, pp. 218-220. 
4. UNRRA, Survey, p. 47). 
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former position as a main supplier and. also took 15 to 20 per cent of 
Italian exports. The Danubian and Balkan countries were also of tradit-
ional importance in Italian trade between the wars.l 
In 19?8 the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
France and the Netherlands were · among Italy 1s principal supplie.rs and 
and as such accounted for over half of Italy 'a foreign trade (excluding 
Italy's dependenciea).2 Furthermore it appeare that Yugoslavia and Austria 
have in the past been Italy's chief suppliers and markets in Eastern Europe:? 
and these countries have: certainly. not been closed to Italian trade by the 
United States, as Mr. Vallance seems to hold. 
Thus American economic foreign policy has in no wa.y disrupted Italy's 
prewar pattern of trade. relationships. 
Mr. Davidson, of course, cannot even claim seri.oue consideration for his _ 
arguments in view of the apparent assumption that he -holds that the source 
4 of Italy 18 troubles is American ec.onomic aid..-
Obstructione to Progress 
But there is. a Communist Party in Italy commanding a wide loyalty among 
large dissaffeeted classes and threatening revolution with impunity. In-
dustrial strikes and a~rarian strife whi.ch newspapers still report with an 
uncomfortable frequenoy also show that social discontent still is great and 
widespread in Italy. Does this indicate that American economic foreign 
policy in Italy has failed? 
The question, it is suggested, is not one of failure .!!• success but of 
the speed of recovery which is attainable. There are certain grave ob-
1. 
2. 
4. 
UNRRA, Survey, P• )97• 
Ibid., p. 478. J• Of. Ibid., P• 41). 
Davidson, New Statesman and Nation, Aug.~ 1949, P• 168. 
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structions in. the way of Italian. economic recovery. 
As already mentioned the. composition of the ruling Italian political 
coalition. me.kee it impossible to achieve change quickly. But even without 
this. fact the solution of Italian social problems would be a-low for some 
time. For~ as we have noted, the country is physically poor. The problem 
ot recovery is one of' overcoming physical barriers as well as· moral ones. 
Thus just before the redistribution of the land around. a Calabrese village 
among its landless inhabitants there people were addressed by the chairman 
of the Sila Project. 
We have ordered some fifty plows. They will be distributed as soon 
as you receive your land. You will be asked to pay for these · plows over 
a period of years. You will also get fertilizer and it will be wise for 
you to pay for it each year, if you can. Remem·ber you must help each 
other. Those of you who have a donkey must lend it to those who haven't. 
You must do that ••• until those without a donkey can plant enou~h fodder 
for a donkey to eat. Then we shall distribute donkeys.l 
For both social and ph~eical reasons, then, the process of revitalizing 
Italy will be, at best, agonizingly slow. Meanwhile the impatient people 
will continue to be restless and, to the extent that this fosters social 
instability, will present an added .obstruction to Italy's recovery. 
Another obstruction to Italian recovery progress, of course, is the con-
flict between American and Italian economic theories of recovery. The ~er-
ican point of view is that Italy needs a policy of full employment. This 
means a program such as the New Deal and the Fair Deal (more properly the 
former in i te early stages-, and the latter in the late s t ages) must be put 
into effect. It means that the Government should go into "pump priming11 
operations and thus create a high level of' economic activity. If inflation 
1. "Italy, the Bear Must Die, 11 ~' LVI, Nov. 6, 1950, P• )1. 
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threatens, money can be drained from . the economy by high taxation. 
The Italians prefer a classical policy. The thesis of this is that 
inflation should be fought by retueing as much as possible governmen,tal 
spending (theref ore reducing the amount of money in the economy). Deflation 
will then bring financial stability to industry, confidence will be reeto.red 
in the economy, and private investment will begin to increase thus creating 
jobs • 
. Thus both policies are seeking to reduce unempl~ent, which is recogni 
as a threat to social and political stability but by different means. '!be 
United States contends that Italy's policy actually prolongs unemployment; 
the Italians. reply that the United States policy can't be carried out in a 
country with Italy's economic structure. Regardless of who is right, the 
fact is that such a conflict while it lasts might retard Italy's recovery 
for there is danger that the Americans and Italians might work at coree 
purposes. 
Another obstruction is the nature of Italy's bureaucracy, which is a 
living and bulky monume.nt to inefficiency. The success. of any pro _;; ram of 
tax reform depends on a bureaucracy whi.ch can actually collect taxes and 
later spend that money in an efficient manner. The success· of such an 
undertaking as the Sila Project of land redistribution .also depends on the 
whole upon an efficien.t bureauc.racy.l In short, much of Italy 'a social 
problem can be effectively reduced only through efficient administration. 
This Italy does not have and there are two reasons why it won't be achieved 
in the near future. One reason has been given by a top EOA official at a 
1. Einaudi, Social Research, XVII, March, 1950, P• ??· 
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gathering of persons interested in public administration. This official 
pointed out that certain countries just do not have the standards of ad-
ministrative efficiency which rule in the United States. Trying to change 
these standards is almost like trying to change human nature and is, at best 
a slow and delicate process of firm persuasion and skilful tact. Italians 
in general are no more aroused by administrative inefficiency, it is sug-
gested, than Americans in general are aroused by the spoils system in state 
and municipal government. 
A second reason for administrative inefficiency is more tragic. If you 
streamline the administrative bureaucracy you only create more unemployment 
therefore · creating a greater social problem than you had to begin with. 
Yet an inefficient bureacracy slows down the process of coming to grips with 
social problems.l 
The United States itselft through its immigration and trade policies, is · 
an obstruction to Italian economic recovery. Ironically EOA, as we have 
seen, in recognition of the fact that Italy.1s population is a great 
on economic recovery, is spending. a million dollars to promo.te Italian 
tion to all other countries~- except the United States. Since · 1924 the 
Johnson Act has cut off the great. flow of Italian immigrants into the United 
States which reached its peak in the early part of the 20th century. Recent 
events show that all that ean be hoped is that Italian immigration to Amari 
will not be restricted even further. 
American foreign trade policy, meantime, despite progress since the early 
1930's when the Reciprocal Trade Program went into effect baa not nearly 
1. Of. Saragat, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, p. 621. 
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done its share in promoting world trade. Foreign trade has remained a ve~ 
minor part of the American economy. The EOA-Comme.rce Mission which has 
studied this problem concluded that the United States has a great existing 
demand ±' or foreign goods· and ser..vic&a which. could be opened to foreign com-
merce by tariff reduction, improved customs procedure and other similar 
adjustments.l 
What is true of. the United States with respect to immigration and foreign 
trade restrictions is true also, of course, of other nations. To a large 
extent Italy has. no control over these factors. The initiative must come 
largely from outside that count~. 
Another obstruction to Italy's economic reconstruction is the psychology 
of much of its people. The- ECA recognizes that 
the success- of the European Recove~ Program depends not only on the 
policies and actions of participating governments but on the enthusiastic 
support of the ERP by the people of Europe. Obstacles to recove~ are 
not alone financial and economic, but also. psychological.2 
The morale of the Italian .people is not particularly high. Part of the 
blame for this bas been put on the Government, which bas failed even to t~ 
to inspire the people to a greater effort toward recovery, or to give them 
a greater sense of urgency.~ Part of the bl.ame lies on the people them-
selves, especially the peasants who, despite their cle.mious support of the 
Communist Party nevertheless do not care to shake -off their age-old lethargy 
which baa been one reason why they have contentedly borne great poverty for . 
centuries4 (and, incidentally, has been one of the causes for traeformismo 
1. E.o.A., Report of the EGA-Commerce Mission, Washington, 1950, pp. 8-l~. 
2. E.C.A., A Report on Recovery Progress, p. 177. 
). Cf. Jucker, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 25, 1951, p. 10. 
4. Levi, New- York Times Magazine, Nov. 6, 1949, pp. 14, 15. Also \Uskemann 
Foreign Affaire, XXVIII, Oct., 1949, p. 88. 
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in Italy). The tragic part of such a psychology is that all the money and 
effort now being expended will be for naught soon after "extraordinary 
outside help" for Italy ceases. 
Part of the blame for this situation lies on the United States Govern-
ment, too, which has done little or nothing in arousing the spirit of the 
people whom i.t has aided economi.cally. The point being emphaaized here is 
not that the United States must win good will among the Italian people. It 
is suggested here that we alreadyhave that. It is eaggeeted rather that, 
in view of the long years of cultural intercourse between Italy and the 
United States and the very closeties of the Italian people to the United 
States where so many of the latter 1s relatives and friends are, the follow-
ing report is entirely accurate. 
An Italian looks at an American as he looks at money. He likes both 
and welcomes them, particularly when they arrive together. But he likes 
them separately too •••• 
Special groups of Italians like Americans because we subsidize eo 
heavily the Vatican and the De Gaspari government. But Giovanni, the 
iceman in Cinecitta, has a better reason. With Americans, hehas found, 
even it' you don 1t make money, you can always relax and be human. Ameri 
give, and they never ask more in return than a fair shake and a smile. 
Ite.lians try to provide a fair shake, and except for a sourpuss mi.nori ty 
of Cominform hyb:tids, the Italian emile is always on tap too, without 
envy, friendly and natural.! 
No, it is in the field of inspiration to rise to the heavy tasks facing 
the Italians that the agencies of American foreign policy have not done a 
good . job. 
Despite these obstructions Italian economic recovery ie making progress 
and pushing back the frontiers of poverty and social unrest. Because of 
1. George Weller, 0 Italians Like Both Americans and Their Money, Either 
Separately or Together, 0 Look, November (?) 1950. 
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these obstructions Italian recovery is a slow, torturous process. 
There is another obstruction to Italian recovery that will loom larger 
and larger from this point onward. That is the possibility that American 
economic aid will either become entirely too little or atop altogether 
after April, 1952 when the ERP expires. 
I 
American economic foreign policy toward Italy has, as already stated, 
social ends. It has as an. end, in effect, a virtual social revolution in 
Italy, for its success will mean an Italy with a muoh lar.ger industrial 
sector, with a mechanized agrarian sector sans .latif'ondisti and a new 
distribution of wealth which will go far toward wiping out an economic 
nobility that has long been more important than the traditional hereditary 
nobility, and has prolonged a system of social feudalism. 
This social policy being promoted by the United States works through 
subtle economic means. Such a poli.cy must negotiate two dangers. First, 
it must take care that the revolution it is fostering will not become :un-
manageable and end in chaos, when a totalitarian regime will arise from 
the shambles of democratic government. On the other hand the revolution 
must not be allowed to stall, lest it lose force and direction and end in 
a state of stagnation. 
~e social revolution which American economic foreign policy has been 
promoting in Italy already has reached a critical stage. Saragat maintains 
that 
the symptons of crisis are visible to all. During recent months there 
have been numerous violent clashes between workers and the police. When 
bloodshed of this kind occurs in a democracy there clearly is something 
very wrong. And yet poverty is slowly but surely decreasing. If the 
economic condition of the workers is in the process of improvement, why 
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do they resort to violence? The fact is that economi.c improvements and 
the promise of social reform are actually the causes of the recent 
disorders.l 
Saragat explains that in a country like Italy which is so very poor 
democracy encounters, at a certain .stage, a contradiction. As soon as the 
workers make some economic gains they demand even better living conditions. 
In a physically wealthy country to grant. this demand is largely a matter 
of further reducing privilege and capitalistic abuses within the framework 
of democratic processes. But in a poor country such as Italy the workers 
are up against not only the greedy rich but nature itself. Thus they are 
tempted to reject democracy and choose totalitarianism. Thus the Italian 
dilemma: 
If economic conditions improve, the social struggle seems to enter an 
acute phase (though this may have a happy outcome). But if economic 
condi tiona are static or deteriorate, then demo.cracy 's day a are counted. 
For then the political struggle boils down to a fight between revolution 
and reaction. The alternatives become Communism or Faseism.2 
American economic foreign policy thus far has tended to keep the re-
pressed social revolution moving. A premature cessation of economic aid 
might well undo our achievements thus far. 
A second danger that American economic foreign policy must negotiate is 
that the American people, as impatient for resul.ts as the Italians, may 
fail to see the progress made by American economic policy in Italy and may 
exert pressure on the American Government to stope, pursuing its present 
policy. 
The American attitude toward economic foreign policy, it seems, is reas 
1. Saragat, Fore ign Affairs, XXVIII, July, 1950, pp. 615-616. 
2. Ibid, PP• 615-617. 
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ably typified by the impli.cations contained in the passage quoted above 
from Look. It is looked upon as a means whereby the United States buys 
a friend. It smacks strongly, to the average American, of moral turpitude 
on our part. Its only justification lies in the direst. necesai ty, the need 
of gaining friends by aey means whateJPer in a struggle for survival. If 
a certain outlay (i.e., a bribe) fails to gain a staunch friend quickly, 
there is no need to prolong an . immoral relationship. 
The subtlety of our economic policy, from the standpoint of its real 
achievements, is such that we might fail to keep our own ends in sight. 
The attitude described above is an indication of this. The es-sential thesis 
of American economic foreign policy is that any democratic country with a 
reasonable degree of economic well.- being i .e bound to be our ally. Our aim 
in Italy is not merely to elicit declarations of fri.endshi.p from a possibly 
unpopular government but to foster democracy. Such a goal, however, is a 
long-run goal and progress toward it will be slow and unspectacular. Pr 
will involve successive but minutegains as one individual · Italian after 
another acquires a real stake in Italy's- economic progress and, therefore, 
an interest in stable, democratic government. Such progress will not for 
some time be perceptible· to the average American citizen. 
The responsibli ty will rest heavily on the American Government to justi-
fy continuation of a positive economic policy, and this can be pr~oted in 
two ways. First, the Government must constantly show· the necessity of 
continued aid through such documents, for example, as the recent Grey 
Re.port. Second, the Government must encourage the . Italian Government to 
show evidence of its -friendship by such gestures, for example, as the recent 
offer to contribute three divisions to a Western European army. 
==-~=====-~========== 
Prospects 
Our chancesof success irl establishing democracy- and economic well-being 
in Italy- are excellent. '!he Italian is· not inexperienc.ed in democratic 
government and his political idee.lsare rooted in the same ancient tradi 
as ours are. Furthermore the Italian is. second to none in his eagerness to 
improve his material condition through .. hard and constant labor. 'Ihere is 
in Italy-, too, a Government friendly- to the United States and eager to 
promote this friendship. 
Above all Italy has the basis for ameliorat-ing its most at;gravating 
problem, overpopulation, and has shown an eager willingness to undertake 
the basically pre-requisite policy for achieving a high level of employ-ment 
of its population, namely-, international cooperation. 
There is a body of opinion that maintains that only- birth control, openly-
advocated and applied,can solve Italy 1s overpopulation prop~em. Birth con-
trol certainly would be a solution but it certainly- is not the only- solu-
tion, .as this paper has tried to show. Furthermore a policy- of vigorously-
advocating birth control would be futile today- and for a long time to come. 
The average Italian is a Roman Catholic, not in an orthodox manner but in 
his outlook and w~ of life. The Catholic Church in Italy is as much a 
product of Italian culture as the latter is of the former. The anti-birth-
control sentiment in Italy- mus.t be seen in this light. Italians s t ill eat 
ao meat on Friday, it is still. an honor to be one of the bearers of the 
image of the l .ocal patron saint on his. feast day, and Italian women (it 
can be guaranteed) will still be scandalized by the - thought of birth control 
by- mechanical means,- all because they are Italians as well as Catholics. 
Perhaps birth control will be generally- practiced in Italy eventually. 
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But, like sin, it will · need no advertisement. Most Italians are no.t so 
backward that they have never heard of birth control, nor so stupid that 
they fail to see its adv-antages. Their re-fusal to adopt birth control 
generally is an irrational, habitual. reaction. to a (to them at least) 
distasteful and immoral practice. But how much more irrational is -Italian 
apathy toward a ruinously excessive birth rate than American apathy toward, 
say, racial discrimination? When Americans find the means . to solve the 
latter problem we may obtain an insight into how to solve the former. 
This writer, of course, is not opposed in principle to advocating birth 
control in Italy. But he is convinced that such aQvocacy will have no . 
real effect on Italians for a long time. Meanwhile any vigorous attempt to 
promote a campaign for birth control at this time. may only result in intro-
ducing more dissenaion among Italians .. when unity is needed. 
It is impnbable thatthe United States can continue to send aid to Italy 
at the current rate. There are.· ever increasing numbers of Americans who 
feel, perhaps rightly, that such a ppliey would require too many sacrifices 
from the people and be too great a strain on the American economy. 
Actually there are means other than purely financial by which the United 
States can help Italy, such as allowing more immigrants to come here, to 
lowe-r its tariff and other trade barriers~ to keep alive the ~ spirit of 
economic cooperation we have already established in Europe. Lately, Amer-
ican economic foreign policy has been taking on a milita~J aspeetl the 
United States and i te allies mobilize for defense. Thirty per cent of the 
Italian budget for the fiscal year 1950-1951 bas been aet aside for military 
1. E.O.!., Ninth Report to Congress, P• ~. 
116 
117 
--- -=-=-~~=========#========~= 
purposes.l It is eeeential that Italy be helped to support such a burden, 
for example, by letting contracts to its factories so that Italians can 
earn the wherewithal ·to finance additional imports. 
Given these largely non-financial aids Italy can continue to make progres 
Ita social problems will. only be solved over a long period of time. '!hey 
are not problems in the. mathematical sense·, i.e., with a right and a wrong 
solution. They need .not be solved like a mathematical problem,- with a 
definite, correct answer. They will work themselves out gradually. The 
United States by 1952 will have. given this process a certain momentum. What 
Italy needs after that 1e the will, and a favorable opportunity, to proceed 
under its own power. 
1. La Produzione in Ital~a, (Milan), July, 1950, (unpagine.ted). 
ABSTRACT 
Since the end of Vlorld War II many nations have experienced e.n internal 
social instability that has undermined their efforts at economic recovery. 
Furthermore this social instability has promoted a s t ate of international 
insecurity and instability. Such a state of affairs is dangerous even to 
a relatively powerful and stable United States. Indeed, it ia believed that 
th e internal social unrest in many countries has encou~aged the rise of 
a ggressive totalitarian forces which threaten the very way of life· which 
the western world has achieved. The United States early took note of this 
situation and set forth on a foreign policy of strengthening world peace 
and prosperity. Our interest, of course, has been both selfish and altru-
istic. 
Among the more unstable elements which have contributed greatly to inter-
national instability has been the social unrest in Italy. The chief cause 
of Italian unrest is the utter poverty of the cotintry. Italy's agricultur-
al endowment, especially in the southern half of the country where there is 
a fatal deficiency of rainfall, has long been physically exhausted and to 
a great extent unproductive. Its unproductiveness has been accentuated by 
the characteristic operation of a feudal system of land tenure which has 
had ita most pernicious effects in the Italian South. 
Italy too lacks the physical basis of a modern powerful industry . It 
has only negligible deposits of poor quality coal, no petroleum and no iron 
ore. Its modest deposits of o t her minerals and its relatively abundant 
hydroelectric power supply, which is located wholly in the North, are in-
sufficient to compensate for the lack of the basic requirements of in-
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dustrialization on a grand scale. 
Only in its abundant manpower can Italy claim adequacy in an economic 
resource, but ironically this resource, which is so scarce in France and 
England, for example, has been forced to remain largely idle or unproduct-
ively engaged. For her physical poverty has forced Italy to be vitally 
dependent upon a high level of international trade for her economic wel-
fare. Only by being able to participate in world trade can Italy sell her 
agricultural products and her manufactured goods in or.der to earn the where-
withal to buy food to supplement ~er own production and raw materials to 
keep her factories running. Italy is a job seeker, so to speak, among 
nations. 
Looked at in this way Italy's "overpopulation" takes on a new signific-
ance. Overpopulation aan be looked upon as an unused resource. The ortho-
dox stereotype which the word overpopulation brings to mind is a picture of 
people jos t ling each other for lack of living apace within the confines of 
national boundaries. As a matter of fact, overpopulation is really a 
measurement of the state of production of goods and services in a country. 
The fundamental solution to Italy's oy.erpopulation, and the unemployment 
which is part of it, requires a high level of world trade activity in which 
Italy can participate. 
The physical poverty of the Italian peninsula has long kept its people 
in a state of misery and abject poverty. A mild climate and a subsistence 
standard of living combined with a hopelessness that became habitual re-
strained the forces of social discontent that always arise from extreme 
poverty. The poverty of Italy in fact gave rise to a feudal agrarian 
society which has had ramifications in industry also. In such a situation 
the rich are too frightened of poverty to give in to the demands of the 
poor, the poor, as they become more desperate, grow more demanding. Thus 
the estate owners and the industrialists try to maintain the status quo, 
even though this obs t r ucts progress and promises no improvement even for 
themselves. The. poor lose more and more of the prescriptive respect for 
the ruling class which they have inherited. These · social antagonisms then 
eventuate in pol itical action. Thus the social fabric of the country is 
strained to the breaking point. 
But po l itics in Italy are highly colored by social problems. In a 
country where poverty has always made a mockery of political principles 
and ideals political labels are alm~st meaningless except as a clue to 
economic conditions. Under such conditions economic policy has a partic-
ul arly strong influence in determining the course of politics. 
The almost complete braakdown of foreign trade following the end of 
World War II haj its worst effects on Italy. That country came to the 
very brink of social disintegration. American postwar economic foreign 
policy toward Italy aimed at preventing such an outcome. Its first major 
phase, UNRRA aid, in which the United States was by far the major contri-
butor, aimed merely at keeping the Italians from starving. The second 
phase, the Foreign Relief Program and the Foreign Aid Program, which oper-
ated from l~ay, 1947 to April, 1948 , aimed both at feeding the people and 
at promoting produ ctive activity in Italy. In April, 1948 Congress passed 
the Foreign Assistance Act, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan, which 
set forth a four-year program for all Europe which aims at revivi~g the 
economies of all participating countries, among which is Italy. 
The Marshall Plan is the heart of present American economic foreign 
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policy in Italy. It has three significant aspects besides its vital 
function of pouring a stream of capital into the country to promote pro-
ductive activities. 
(1) It is a study in effective international .cooperation of the most 
intimate kind. Both the United States and Italy are managing the Italian 
economy. Neither can act, with respect to Marshall Plan programs, without 
the consent and cooperation of. the other. It is a tribute to the good will 
and wisdom of the leaders of both countries that they have performed as 
well as. they have. 
(2) The most important accomplishment of the Marshall Plan has been the 
progress it has made and inspired in the creatLon of a unified European 
economy and in the unshackling of intra.-European trade. If the Marshall 
Plan had been created for the exclusive benefit of Italy (and of course it 
was not) these two programs would still have been its main pillars. 
(.?) '!he United States, by moral suasion and by contributing a large 
part of the needed capital is successfully urging the ' Italian Government to 
undertake extensive programs of agrarian reform and rehabilitation. Since 
about one-halt of Italy's population is agrarian it is easy to see the 
significance of such reform in quieting social discontent in Italy. 
In the f ield of fiscal policy the American and the Italian authorities 
are having difficulty in reaching agreement. The American position is that 
since industrial unemployment presents a grave social problem government 
fiscal policy should encourage industrial expansion, even at the risk of 
inflation to which Italy is much more susceptible than a more richly endowed 
country and which once before has had disastrous results in Italy. The 
Italian authorities prefer to rlsk the social dangers of unemployment 
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rather than those of inflation and argue that a res t rictive fiscal policy 
will at least enable Italy to reach a level of economic activity which can 
be maintained after American aid ceases. Both sides make sense in theory. 
In practice they must inevitably compromise, for an extreme policy runs 
too much risk of disaster. 
The object of American foreign policy in Italy is to foster an economic-
ally sound, democratic ally in the Mediterranean. But democracy (and social 
stability) cannot grow in a poverty stricken country with a feudal agrarian 
sector and a sullen people. Obviously a social r evolution must be brought 
about in Italy but not through such .means or at such a rate of speed that 
the present instability will only be replaced by chaos. It is contended 
here that as the frontier s of poverty are gradually pushed back and as 
social r eforms give the individual Italian a concrete stake in stable, 
demo cratic government a social r evolution will come about and democracy 
will flourish. Already poverty has been reduced considerably with American 
aid. A result of this, however, has been the generation of a. stronger 
popular demand for increased social reforms. Herein lies the danger of 
complete dtaaster, for if social pr ogres s overshoots the economic progress 
which along can give it r eal meaning, the popular reaction is likely to be 
explosive. 
Only a daydreamer will eupp.oae that Italy 'e social problems will be 
solved within a short time. It is optimistic even to think that they will 
be "solved" at all. For we are dealing not with mathematical solutions but 
rather with progress. 
American economieforeign policy in Italy has made it possible for the 
wheels of Italy's economy to overcome the inertia of its postwar immobility. 
122 
Such features of it as the freeing of international trade ~~d such desirable 
future features of it as a more liberal tariff policy will benefit Italy 
even after the present flow of American capital into that country shall 
have ceased or been reduced to a trickle. Ita continuing effect, the gradua 
rise in Italian living standards. and the social change t his will inevitably 
accomplish probably will go largely unnoticed. But it is contended here 
that American economic foreign policy in Italy is in fact promoting social 
change in that country at a rate consistent with orderly progress and 
favorable to the gradual strengthening of stability in a democratic order. 
12) 
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